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INTRODUCTION 
A few weeks after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in Her-
bert v. Lando,1 in which the Court refused to prohibit libel plaintiffs 
from inquiring about journalists’ editorial processes,2 Justice William 
Brennan delivered his renowned address at Rutgers University in 
which he proposed two models for evaluating free-press cases.3  Bren-
nan’s speech immediately entered the pantheon of First Amendment 
theory, but it was just as remarkable for its cold critique of the news 
media and their advocates whom Brennan flayed for their hyperbolic 
responses to some of the Court’s press rulings.  He scoffed at a Los 
Angeles Times editorial suggesting that Herbert would lead to “Orwel-
lian invasion[s] of the mind,”4 and he chided Jack Landau, then head 
of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, for his over-
heated claim that Herbert would destroy the press’s “last constitutional 
shred of . . . editorial privacy and independence from the govern-
ment.”5  Brennan was an unlikely critic of the press,6 but he was just 
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 1 441 U.S. 153 (1979). 
 2 Id. at 160 (holding that it would be unreasonable to prohibit plaintiffs from inquiring 
about what the defendant knew and discussed prior to publication because libel plaintiffs 
must prove that the defendant acted with some degree of fault). 
 3 William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Newhouse Dedication Ad-
dress (Oct. 17, 1979), in 5 MEDIA L. REP. 1837, 1838 (1980) (“Under one model—which I 
call the ‘speech’ model—the press requires and is accorded the absolute protection of 
the First Amendment.  In the other model—I call it the ‘structural’ model—the press’ in-
terests may conflict with other societal interests and adjustment of the conflict on occa-
sion favors the competing claim.”). 
 4 Id. at 1841 (quoting Assoc. Press, Editors, Broadcasters Warn of ‘Chilling Effect’ of Court Rul-
ing, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1979, at B16). 
 5 Id.  (quoting TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 20, 1979, at 18).  Brennan argued that 
by permitting libel plaintiffs to inquire into the editorial decision-making of a news or-
ganization, the Court was not subjecting journalists to unreasonable examination.  In-
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one of a chorus of people7 who had begun to warn journalists that 
their overzealous self-advocacy was eroding the support they had cul-
tivated in the years following Watergate8 and that by arrogantly stak-
ing out an elite social position for themselves and demanding a set of 
“special . . . rights” not possessed by the public generally, they were 
courting a backlash.9 
Three decades later, the charge of media arrogance and excep-
tionalism is still at the core of the contemporary American press cri-
tique.  The news media remain the targets of reprobation in part be-
cause the public perceives them as demanding a unique set of legal 
protections.10  This is particularly true in the context of the reporter’s 
privilege11 and the debates over the proposed federal shield law,12 in 
 
quiries into a defendant’s state of mind or intent are common in other areas of the law, 
Brennan noted, and to say that journalists should be immune from such inquiries is to 
suggest that their minds are “somehow special, and cannot be impinged for any purpose.”  
Id.  Nevertheless, Brennan appreciated that those kinds of inquiries presented some risks.  
He therefore dissented in Herbert to emphasize that while journalists should not be im-
mune from these inquiries, some qualified protection is necessary to minimize the poten-
tial for excessive intervention.  Herbert, 441 U.S. at 183 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 6 Brennan was a reliable supporter of the rights of the press and was the author of the 
Court’s opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which is widely re-
garded as the Court’s most important First Amendment ruling.  The Sullivan Court held 
that as part of their prima facie libel claims, public official plaintiffs must prove, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that the defendant acted “with actual malice—that is, with 
knowledge that [their publication] was false or with reckless disregard [for the truth].”  
Id. at 279–80. 
 7 See infra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
 8 See David A. Jones, Why Americans Don’t Trust the Media:  A Preliminary Analysis, 9 HARV. 
INT’L J. PRESS/POL. 60, 61 (2004) (noting that national surveys showed high public sup-
port for the press throughout the 1970s). 
 9 See William W. Van Alstyne, Comment, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a “Preferred Posi-
tion,” 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761, 768 (1977). 
 10 See, e.g., Ryan Pitts, Readers Speak:  Journalists in Jail, Federal Shield Law, POYNTER ONLINE, 
July 23, 2005, http://www.poynter.org/content/content_view.asp?id=85751 (addressing 
public opinion about the reporter’s privilege and quoting several respondents, such as 
Keith Pennock, who said, “Last time I checked reporters are not a special class of citizen 
afforded different rights and privileges than the rest of us.”). 
 11 Generally speaking, the reporter’s privilege allows journalists to refuse to comply with 
certain subpoenas seeking their testimony or work product.  Some form of the privilege is 
recognized in most federal jurisdictions, either as a matter of constitutional law, common 
law, or administrative procedure.  See infra note 18. 
 12 In 2007, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill (Free Flow of Information Act of 
2007, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007)) that would establish a federal shield law, 
but the Senate did not vote on its version of the bill (Free Flow of Information Act of 
2007, S. 1267, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007)) before Congress adjourned. 
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which journalists’ pleas are frequently dismissed as attempts to posi-
tion themselves as “a priestly class above everybody else.”13 
This press-public divide has been a central feature of First Amend-
ment litigation over the past thirty five years as the courts have moved 
beyond issues of expressive freedom.  Since Branzburg v. Hayes14 in 
1972, the paramount free-press battles have been less about the dis-
semination of information than its acquisition.15  In both state and 
federal courts, journalists have sought recognition of rights of access 
to government records and places,16 protection against certain civil 
 
 13 The McLaughlin Group (PBS television broadcast Sept. 1–2, 2007), transcript available at 
http://www.mclaughlin.com/library/transcript.htm?id=613.  The “priestly class” charac-
terization has been a favorite among critics of the reporter’s privilege.  See, e.g., Howard 
Kurtz, Contempt & Praise for Reporter:  Facing Jail, Judith Miller Gains Support for Stance, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2005, at C1 (quoting the National Review’s Jonah Goldberg as say-
ing, “journalists consider themselves ‘a priestly class’ that doesn’t have to play by the rules 
governing ordinary citizens”); Scott MacKay, Plame Takes on Bush Policies in Speech, 
PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 5, 2007, at B1 (quoting Valerie (Plame) Wilson as saying, “Journalists 
are not a priestly class”).  A quarter-century ago, former publisher William Rusher 
painted the same portrait.  “I object,” Rusher wrote, “to journalists being regarded as a 
sort of creeping priesthood, characterized by special powers and limitations—en route, 
presumably, to celibacy.”  Bulger v. Boston Cmty. Media Council (1976) (Rusher, J., con-
curring), in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST III 380 (1979). 
 14 408 U.S. 665 (1972).  Branzburg considered whether journalists have First Amendment 
protection against grand jury subpoenas seeking testimony about their confidential 
sources.  The Court majority refused to recognize a privilege, but the decisive fifth vote 
was supplied by Justice Lewis Powell, who wrote separately to suggest that there might be 
situations in which shielding reporters is warranted.  Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring) 
(“In short, the courts will be available to newsmen under circumstances where legitimate 
First Amendment interests require protection.”).  Powell suggested that courts take a 
case-by-case approach to assessing privilege claims.  Id. 
 15 From the early 1930s through the early 1970s, the Court’s press cases dealt almost exclu-
sively with the constitutionality of direct government restraints on expression.  See, e.g., 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel); Miami Herald Publ’g Co.v. Torn-
illo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (compelled speech); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 
713 (1971) (prior restraints); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1966) (privacy); N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 
(1931) (prior restraints).  In the three decades since Branzburg, the Court has turned 
more of its attention to autonomy and newsgathering issues.  See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles 
Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (protection against enforcement of generally applicable 
laws); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (access to courts); 
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (protection against inquiries regarding editorial 
processes); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (access to prisons); Zurcher v. 
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (protection against newsroom searches). 
 16 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 555 (seeking recognition of a First Amendment 
right of access to criminal trials); Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) 
(seeking access to judicial records); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (seek-
ing recognition of a First Amendment right of access to federal prisons). 
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and criminal penalties triggered by their newsgathering activity,17 and 
protection against government interference with their source rela-
tionships,18 among other things.19  They have also fought for statutory 
protection from both Congress and state legislatures, particularly on 
those issues, and in those jurisdictions, where the courts have been 
less solicitous.  Despite some important successes,20 many of these ef-
forts have been derailed by judges and lawmakers who bristle at the 
idea of endowing journalists with additional immunities, particularly 
when more than one-third of Americans say the press already has 
“too much freedom.”21 
 
 17 See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the First 
Amendment does not protect journalists when they engage in illegal conduct); Food 
Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that journal-
ists enjoy no special immunity from tort claims arising out of their newsgathering behav-
ior). 
 18 Because Branzburg was essentially a 4.5 to 4.5 decision, see discussion supra note 14, lower 
federal courts were free to recognize a privilege in cases dissimilar to those at issue in 
Branzburg.  As a result, several circuits have recognized at least a qualified privilege.  See In 
re Madden, 151 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 
1998); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 
1992); United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1988); von Bulow v. 
von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487 (11th 
Cir. 1986).  Two circuits have explicitly rejected the privilege.  See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 
339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987).  
Other courts have recognized varying levels of protection under the First Amendment, 
state constitutions, state or federal common law, or state and federal administrative pro-
cedures.  In addition, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia have enacted shield 
laws that provide explicit statutory protection.  See generally Reporters Comm. for Freedom 
of the Press, Privilege Compendium, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/index.php (last vis-
ited Jan. 15, 2009).  Congress has also considered, but has not yet passed, a federal shield 
law.  See supra note 12. 
 19 See, e.g., Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665 (rejecting journalists’ pleas for First Amendment protec-
tion against a civil promissory estoppel suit arising out of the journalists’ breach of confi-
dentiality agreements with source). 
 20 The most notable are the press victories in a line of court-access cases in the 1980s.  See 
Press-Enter. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986) (recognizing right of access to transcripts 
of preliminary hearings in criminal cases); Press-Enter. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 510 
(1984) (recognizing right of access to voir dire in criminal cases); Globe Newspaper Co. 
v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 610–11 (1982) (striking down state law that peremptorily 
closed courtrooms in which minors would be testifying in sexual assault cases); Richmond 
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 (recognizing First Amendment right to attend criminal trials).  
Also significant are journalists’ successes in reporter’s privilege cases in the lower federal 
courts.  See supra note 18. 
 21 First Amendment Center,  ’07 Survey Shows Americans’ Views Mixed on Basic Freedoms, 
(Sept. 24, 2007), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=19031 (noting 
that 34% of respondents say the press has “too much” freedom, 50% say it has about the 
right amount of freedom, and only 13% say it has “too little” freedom).  In this annual 
survey, those saying the press has “too much” freedom peaked at 53% in 1999.  Id. 
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There are three key assumptions that have long pervaded these 
critiques and that have misdirected many of the judicial, scholarly, 
and popular assessments.  One is that the press has, in fact, sought to 
secure for itself a special menu of legal protections.22  The second is 
that the Supreme Court and the media litigants have proposed dia-
metric frameworks—both theoretical and doctrinal—for the resolu-
tion of free-press controversies, particularly those relating to news-
gathering.  And the third is that the Court has largely settled the core 
questions surrounding the rights of the press, making these subse-
quent legal maneuvers by journalists all the more gratuitous.23  Each 
of these assumptions is substantially false, and each continues to play 
a role in undermining the rights of all people to gather and dissemi-
nate news. 
This Article addresses the validity of these assumptions by examin-
ing the briefs24 filed by media litigants in First Amendment cases 
brought before the Supreme Court between the 1971–72 term and 
the 2006–07 term, as well as the opinions of the Court (majority, con-
curring, and dissenting) in those cases.25  This Article seeks to vali-
date, refute, or clarify longstanding beliefs about the Court’s rulings 
and rationales by evaluating eighty of its media cases.  It also provides 
the first systematic evaluation of the aims and tactics of the media liti-
gants, along with the frameworks they advanced in their briefs to the 
Court in these cases.  This is useful not only to satisfy historical curi-
osities, but also to inform the ongoing public and judicial debates 
over the scope of press freedom and the right to gather news.26  These 
debates are as robust as ever,27 but they will not be productive if they 
are oriented around specious assumptions about the Court’s free-
press jurisprudence.  And to the extent that the participants misun-
 
 22 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Courts Grow Increasingly Skeptical of Any Special Protections for the Press, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2005, at A16. 
 23 See Michael Battle, No Special Privilege, USA TODAY, June 22, 2006, at A12 (“The law is 
clear.  The U.S. Supreme Court declined to interpret the First Amendment to grant 
newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Steve Chapman, The News Media vs. The Innocent, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 
27, 2008 (calling journalists who invoke the reporter’s privilege “slow learners about the 
obligations they share with their fellow citizens” for defying the court). 
 24 In all cases before the Court, both petitioners and respondents must file a brief outlining 
their case and explaining why the Court should rule in their favor. 
 25 For more on the criteria applied to the selection of cases, see infra Part II. 
 26 Indeed, the two are intertwined in the sense that the flawed conventional wisdom contin-
ues to shape the way the public perceives the press’s claims. 
 27 For example, the Journal of Mass Media Ethics devoted its entire Fall 2007 issue to this ques-
tion.  See also JAY ROSEN, WHAT ARE JOURNALISTS FOR? (2001); Gina Barton, What Is a 
Jour·na·list?, QUILL MAG., May 2002, at 10. 
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derstand the objectives and arguments of the media litigants, any po-
tential points of concurrence will likely be lost in the fog of anti-press 
rhetoric. 
The broader aim of this Article is to provide fodder for those who 
hope to establish some theoretical and doctrinal congruity in this 
area of law.28  This has to start with a clear understanding of the 
Court’s decisions and the principles that animate them, and it can 
also be advanced by reexamining the arguments of the media liti-
gants to see if they provide a more cogent construction. 
The results of this analysis show, among other things, that the 
media litigants have not sought recognition of special rights or pro-
posed a framework that distinguishes between mainstream and more 
peripheral media.  Indeed, they have been more diligent than the 
Court in avoiding references and arguments that separate speech and 
press and that imply the need for unusual scrutiny of restraints target-
ing media defendants.  The litigants have also more consistently 
championed an “egalitarian”29 conception of the press that recognizes 
the ability and right of all citizens to seek and disseminate news.  The 
Court, meanwhile, has misconceived the nature of special rights, it 
has falsely accused the media litigants of seeking such rights, and it 
has relied on a conventional conception of the press that belies the 
“lonely pamphleteer” archetype it idealized in Branzburg v. Hayes.30 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the central arguments 
made by those opposed to recognition of expansive press and news-
gathering rights, and it also addresses the consequences of those cri-
tiques.  Part II describes the key research questions and explains the 
rationale for the selection of cases and briefs examined here.  Part III 
presents the results of the analyses of the Court’s opinions and media 
litigant briefs.  Part IV contains the conclusions and recommenda-
tions. 
 
 28 C. Edwin Baker makes the same plea suggesting that, in the absence of normative clarity, 
the courts will inevitably produce conflicting decisions.  See C. Edwin Baker, The Independ-
ent Significance of the Press Clause under Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 1024 (2007) 
(“The Court and the law should get it right!”). 
 29 Erik Ugland & Jennifer Henderson, Who Is a Journalist and Why Does it Matter?  Disentan-
gling the Legal and Ethical Arguments, 22 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 241, 246–47 (2007) (distin-
guishing an egalitarian model of the press from an expert model of the press); see also in-
fra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 30 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972) (“[L]iberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer 
who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan pub-
lisher . . . .”). 
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I.  CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The law of newsgathering is a patchwork of conflicting case law,31 
appended by an assortment of statutes that, in some cases, provide 
journalists with special dispensations.32  The absence of uniformity is 
partly a consequence of the infirmities in the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence and its indefinite rulings in free-press 
cases33; more immediately, it is the result of the lower courts’ willing-
ness to supply their own doctrine,34 and of journalists’ persistence in 
lobbying for legislative accommodations.35 
This fractured legal landscape mirrors, and is partly the product 
of, the broader divisions between the press and the courts.  Each has 
some legitimate grievances against the other, but each is also occa-
sionally guilty of mischaracterizing the other’s honest efforts.  Some 
journalists are quick to demonize those who doubt their need for 
protection and to catastrophize the effects of unfavorable court rul-
ings.36  At the same time, judges and public critics too often misper-
ceive journalists’ legal claims as acts of self-aggrandizement rather 
than as sincere attempts to vindicate the rights of all citizens to be, as 
the Framers put it, “bulwarks of liberty.”37 
 
 31 See generally Erik Ugland, Demarcating the Right to Gather News:  A Sequential Interpretation of 
the First Amendment, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 101 (2008). 
 32 See infra note 35. 
 33 See infra Parts III.A.1, III.B.1, III.C.1. 
 34 The law of reporter’s privilege, for example, is defined as much by federal circuit court 
decisions—many of which recognize some protection for reporters’ sources and work 
product—as it is by the Court’s opinion in Branzburg.  See supra note 18. 
 35 In addition to the dozens of state shield laws that have been passed in the wake of Bran-
zburg, see supra note 18, journalists have:  (1) secured protections against some news room 
searches, e.g., Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a) (2000); (2) successfully lob-
bied for retraction statutes that limit plaintiff’s libel suits targeting media defendants, e.g., 
WIS. STAT. § 895.05 (2008); and (3) secured exemptions from some of the fees normally 
charged for records requests under state and federal open records statutes, e.g., The 
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2006) (“[F]ees shall be limited 
to reasonable standard charges . . . when records are not sought for commercial use and 
the request is made by . . . a representative of the news media . . . .”). 
 36 See, e.g., Cathy Packer, Op-Ed., What Became of the First Amendment?, NEWS & OBSERVER, 
Oct. 25, 2007, at A11 (calling the spate of journalist subpoenas “the most vicious and cal-
culated attack on the free press in America since the Nixon administration”); see also Jack 
Shafer, First Amendment Chicken Little, SLATE, Dec. 17, 2004, 
http://www.slate.com/id/=2111206/ (criticizing Washington Post columnist E.J. Dionne 
and others for overreacting to journalist subpoenas). 
 37 This phrase was commonly repeated by patriot printers and was included in James Madi-
son’s first draft of the First Amendment.  See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press 
Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 478 (1983).  The phrase was originally drawn from Cato’s 
Letters.  See John Trenchard & Thomas Gordon, Of Freedom of Speech:  That the Same is In-
separable from Publick Liberty, in 1 CATO’S LETTERS; OR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND 
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It is certainly reasonable for judges to be concerned about bestow-
ing special protections on the press.  Doing so could disrupt the 
“ethos of equality”38 that pervades the Constitution, and it could initi-
ate some doctrinal creep toward the unsteady world of situational 
balancing.  Journalists, meanwhile, have their own valid concerns.  
Their constitutional and statutory protections are increasingly frag-
ile—some say “under assault”39—in a post-September 11th environ-
ment in which judges have shown impatience with many rights-based 
claims.40  In just the past few years, dozens of journalists have been 
subpoenaed in civil and criminal cases,41 several have been held in 
contempt,42 and a few have been sent to jail for refusing to expose 
their confidential sources.43 
 
RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 96, 100 (1733) (“Freedom of Speech is the 
great Bulwark of Liberty; they prosper and die together . . . .”). 
 38 See Ugland, supra note 31, at 149. 
 39 See, e.g., Jessica Meyers, Fighting Like Tigers:  A Conference Explores How to Protect Sources in a 
Hostile Legal and Political Climate, AM. JOURNALISM REV., June/July 2006, at 58 (“The jour-
nalist-source relationship so essential to investigative reporting has come under assault.”). 
 40 For a series of reports concerning the way judges have handled rights-based claims, see 
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Secret Justice, http://rcfp.org/secretjustice/ 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
 41 New York Times reporter James Risen was recently subpoenaed by a grand jury to identify 
confidential sources for his book State of War.  See Philip Shenon, Times Reporter Subpoenaed 
Over Source for Book Chapter, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2008, at A17.  Risen is just one of dozens 
who have been subpoenaed in the past few years.  Fifteen reporters have been subpoe-
naed in the Privacy Act suit filed by Dr. Steven Hatfill who claims the government falsely 
accused him of being behind the anthrax attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., five 
reporters have been subpoenaed in the grand jury investigation of the BALCO labora-
tory, and eight reporters have been subpoenaed in the ongoing federal investigation into 
illegal leaks at the White House.  For a more complete account of these and other cases, 
see Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Shields and Subpoenas:  The Reporter’s 
Privilege in Federal Courts, http://www.rcfp.org/shields_and_subpoenas.html#number 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
 42 Most recently, U.S. District Court Judge Reggie Walton held former USA Today reporter 
Toni Locy in contempt for refusing to identify her confidential sources in Dr. Steven Hat-
fill’s Privacy Act suit.  Torsten Ove, Ex-Reporter Put in Tough Spot in Fight Over Sources, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 16, 2008, at A1. 
 43 Video blogger Josh Wolf spent more than seven months in jail (the longest time ever 
served by a journalist in a contempt case) for refusing to comply with a subpoena seeking 
his testimony and video footage about a violent protest that he had covered.  His attempts 
to quash the subpoena failed and his appeal was denied on September 8, 2006.  In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena, 201 F. App’x 430 (9th Cir. 2006).  Wolf was released after reaching 
an agreement with prosecutors to post his video footage on his Weblog.  Reporters 
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Blogger Released from Prison, Apr. 4, 2007, 
http://rcfp.org/news/2007/0404-con-blogge.html.  Former New York Times reporter Ju-
dith Miller spent eighty-five days in jail in 2005 for refusing to identity the source who 
leaked the name of undercover CIA agent, Valerie (Plame) Wilson, to her.  Her appeal of 
the contempt charge was rejected.  In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 
2005).  Television reporter Jim Taricani was confined at home for six months for refusing 
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In other cases, journalists have had their phone records seized44 or 
their mail confiscated.45  Journalists have been denied access to places 
and records that have traditionally been part of their reportorial do-
mains,46 and they still have no significant protection against civil suits 
targeting their newsgathering activity.47 
Journalists’ efforts to preserve or restore these protections have 
been met with suspicion from citizen-critics,48 judges,49 lawyers,50 poli-
ticians,51 constitutional scholars,52 and even some journalists.53  Vet-
 
to identify a confidential source in a story he produced about government corruption.  
William Ketter, Law Might Be Bad News for Press Freedom, JOURNAL-GAZETTE (Fort Wayne, 
Ind.), July 17, 2008, at 11A.  And in 2001–2002, freelance author Vanessa Leggett was 
held in contempt and served 168 days in jail for refusing to turn over tapes of interviews 
she had conducted with witnesses whom prosecutors believed had information relevant to 
a murder investigation.  Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Vanessa Leggett Re-
leased from Jail after 168 Days (Jan. 4, 2002), http://www.rcfp.org/news/releases/
view.php?2002_01_04_vlreleas.txt. 
 44 In 2004, U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald seized the phone records of two New York Times 
reporters in order to learn the identities of their confidential sources.  N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 2006).  The reporters’ challenge to the seizure was 
subsequently rejected.  Id. at 174.  More recently, police in St. Paul seized the cell phone 
records of KMSP-TV (Minneapolis) reporter Tom Lyden in order to uncover the identity 
of one of his sources.  Mara H. Gottfried, Police Return Reporter’s Records, ST. PAUL PIONEER 
PRESS, Dec. 19, 2007. 
 45 In 2003, a package sent by one Associated Press reporter in the Philippines to a co-worker 
in the United States was intercepted and confiscated by the FBI, even though the seized 
document was from a public record.  Associated Press, FBI Returns Lab Report to News Ser-
vice, May 11, 2003, available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=
11455. 
 46 For example, reporters are barred from Dover Air Force Base, where the bodies of Ameri-
can troops killed abroad are returned to the United States.  See Brian Faler, Rules Change 
on Seeing Troops’ Remains Return:  Families May See Caskets’ Removal from Planes, WASH. POST, 
June 24, 2004, at A18 (noting that while this policy went into effect in 1991, it was not 
consistently enforced until after the start of the Iraq War). 
 47 The most significant case in this area is Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 
505 (4th Cir. 1999), holding that journalists are not protected from civil claims, such as 
fraud or trespass, triggered by their newsgathering activity, even though they are pro-
tected against damage awards related to their subsequent publication or broadcast. 
 48 See supra note 10. 
 49 See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We do not see why there 
need to be special criteria merely because the possessor of the documents or other evi-
dence sought is a journalist.” (emphasis added)). 
 50 See supra note 23. 
 51 See, e.g., Elizabeth Williamson, House Passes Bill to Protect Confidentiality of Reporters’ Sources, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2007, at A3 (“Rep. Lamar Smith (Tex.), ranking Republican on the 
House Judiciary Committee, opposed the [federal shield bill], echoing Justice Depart-
ment concerns that ‘this legislation will impede its efforts to conduct its investigations 
and prosecute criminals’ and adding:  ‘No one should be above the law, not even the 
press.’”). 
 52 See, e.g., Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and Fourth Estate Inmates:  The Misguided Pur-
suit of a Reporter’s Privilege, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 385, 386 (2007) (questioning the 
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eran New York Times reporter Anthony Lewis is a longtime opponent 
of reporter’s privilege and says its recognition would only “add[] to 
the already evident public feeling that the press thinks it is entitled to 
special treatment.”54  He added at a 2007 meeting of media lawyers 
that “[j]ournalists shouldn’t act [as if] their rights are always superior 
to those of others.”55  The critics have reserved their most biting at-
tacks for those journalists who have gone to jail to protect their 
sources.  University of Chicago law professor Geoffrey Stone accuses 
these reporters of seeking martyrdom:  “It is undoubtedly great dra-
ma.  But where does a reporter get off insisting that he is above the 
law, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution?”56 
These comments are typical in that they assume the law is clear, 
which it is not,57 and that journalists have in fact sought truly special 
rights, which, for the most part, they have not.58  Nevertheless, these 
arguments have been repeated ad nauseam for decades.  Twenty-
eight years ago, constitutional scholar Ronald Dworkin accused the 
press of viewing the First Amendment as “a kind of private charter, 
and attack[ing] more or less automatically every refusal of the courts 
to find some further protection in that charter.”59  And in 1979, for-
mer National Review publisher, William Rusher complained about 
what he called a “brand-new bid by an aggressive and highly political-
ized press for privileges and immunities which it has never previously 
had, which it neither needs nor deserves, and which it would be dan-
gerous to confer upon it.”60  Arguments like these were sometimes 
 
“social utility” of reporter’s privilege); Kara A. Larsen, Note, The Demise of the First Amend-
ment-Based Reporter’s Privilege:  Why this Current Trend Should Not Surprise the Media, 37 CONN. 
L. REV. 1235 (2005) (examining the evolution of reporter’s privilege). 
 53 See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Privilege & the Press, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 14, 2005 (reviewing 
FLOYD ABRAMS, SPEAKING FREELY:  TRIALS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2005)) (arguing that 
the press should only have qualified privilege, not absolute privilege). 
 54 Id.  Lewis made this same basic argument about the lack of public support for the press 
being “constitutionally unique” three decades ago.  Anthony Lewis, A Preferred Position for 
Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 609 (1979). 
 55 Anthony Lewis, Address at the Communications Law Conference of the Practising Law 
Institute (Nov. 8, 2007). 
 56 Paul McMasters & Geoffrey R. Stone, Debate Club:  Do Journalists Need a Better Shield?, LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, Dec. 6, 2004, http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/dc_printerfriendly. 
msp?id=21. 
 57 There are many people who still contend, for example, that Branzburg settled the ques-
tion of reporter’s privilege.  See supra note 23. 
 58 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 59 Ronald Dworkin, Is the Press Losing the First Amendment?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 4, 1980, at 
49. 
 60 William Rusher, Statement on the Press and the Courts, in NATIONAL NEWS COUNCIL, IN THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST II 353 (1979). 
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aimed less at individual journalists than at advocacy groups like the 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,61 but it was often as-
sumed that they shared the same vision.62  Indeed, the notion still 
persists that journalists are a kind of united brotherhood of profes-
sionals who all read from the same script on press freedom. 
Some critics have focused their attacks on mainstream or tradi-
tional journalists whom they accuse of trying to appropriate the First 
Amendment for their own purposes while denying it to those who 
lack their professional pedigree.63  Certainly some journalists have 
sought to distinguish their practices and standards from those of 
other communicators,64 but it is uncommon for them to suggest that 
the First Amendment be construed to provide additional protections 
to those in the higher echelons of their field.65  Nevertheless, the 
abiding assumption since Branzburg has been that the institutional 
media have sought special rights for themselves, and that in order to 
secure those protections, they have constructed “novel and strained 
interpretations of [the] First and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution.”66  The most significant of these is the notion that the 
Speech Clause67 and Press Clause68 be interpreted as having constitu-
tionally discrete meanings.  Justice Potter Stewart is the intellectual 
architect of this framework, which he outlined in a 1975 speech at 
 
 61 Indeed, Brennan’s Rutgers address seems to target press advocates as much as journalists 
themselves.  See supra note 3. 
 62 Media lawyer Cameron DeVore said “[t]he Reporters Committee [under Jack Landau] 
was strident and sometimes off-putting to owners, and its legal ideas were not always in 
tune with the attorneys it called upon.”  Floyd J. McKay, First Amendment Guerillas:  Forma-
tive Years of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, JOURNALISM & COMM. 
MONOGRAPHS, Autumn 2004, at 107, 125.  Jane Kirtley, Landau’s successor, added:  “It 
wasn’t so much that we were troubled by Jack expressing an opinion, a point of view; the 
problem was that in some quarters he was perceived to speak for the media.”  Id. at 132. 
 63 Matt Welch, Why Does Old Media Trash the New?, ONLINE JOURNALISM REV., June 24, 1998, 
http://www.ojr.org/ojr/ethics/1017968389.php (discussing the views of mainstream me-
dia towards Internet-based media). 
 64 See Clarence Page, Who’s a Journalist?, ONLINE NEWSHOUR, June 7, 2005, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/essays/jan-june05/page_6-7.html (discussing who consti-
tutes a journalist). 
 65 Indeed, many mainstream journalists also operate blogs, and many full-time bloggers 
once worked for traditional news organizations.  See Jessi Hempel, Are Bloggers Journalists?, 
BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 7, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/
mar2005/tc2005037_7877_tc024.htm. 
 66 William Rusher, supra note 60, at 360.  Rusher added that journalists are “embarking on a 
new and fateful course . . . to distinguish the media from the people as a whole.  In doing 
so, they run a grave risk of alienating the public permanently.”  Id. 
 67 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
 68 Id. (“Congress shall make no law . . .  abridging the freedom of . . . the press . . . .”). 
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Yale Law School.69  Stewart, who dissented in Branzburg,70 argued that 
while the Speech Clause protects the rights of all citizens to freely ex-
press themselves, the Press Clause is a “structural provision” that pro-
tects “the institutional autonomy of the press,” which encompasses its 
confidential relationships with sources, among other things.71 
This construction of the First Amendment was widely criticized.72  
But many critics have incorrectly assumed that those seeking to pre-
serve or augment press freedoms have drawn their inspiration from 
Stewart; that they have used his model as the theoretical foundation 
for their legal arguments before the courts, and, perhaps most im-
portantly, that they have embraced Stewart’s narrow definition of 
“the press,” which encompassed only the “daily newspapers and other 
established news media.”73  The remainder of this Article shows that 
none of these claims has any validity with respect to the arguments 
made by the litigants in their briefs, and that the Court itself, by re-
peatedly and inappropriately using the special-rights aspersion to dis-
credit the media litigants’ claims, has probably contributed as much 
as any party to the persistent misunderstandings about the litigants’ 
aims and the legitimacy of their constitutional arguments.  The 
Court’s own free-press jurisprudence, meanwhile, is ambiguous and 
contradictory and provides a far less stable model for resolving free-
press controversies than the one reflected in the litigants’ briefs. 
II.  CENTRAL QUESTIONS AND SCOPE OF ANALYSIS 
There are three general questions that have defined this debate 
since Branzburg and that are still constitutionally salient:  (1) Does the 
Press Clause have a meaning independent of the Speech Clause?  (2) 
Does the Constitution endow journalists, “the press,” or subsets of 
 
 69 Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975). 
 70 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 743 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that be-
fore a journalist could be made to comply with a subpoena, the government ought to be 
forced to:  “(1) show . . . probable cause to believe that the newsman has information that 
is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the infor-
mation sought cannot be obtained by alternative means . . . ; and (3) demonstrate a com-
pelling and overriding interest in the information.” (footnote omitted)). 
 71 Stewart, supra note 69, at 633–34 (emphasis omitted). 
 72 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 53, at 597 (disagreeing with the notion of a preferred status for 
journalists); Robert D. Sack, Reflections on the Wrong Question:  Special Constitutional Privilege 
for the Institutional Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 629, 629 (1979) (arguing that the “ultimate 
question” is “whether the press’ legal protection is adequate to enable it to perform its 
role properly”); Van Alstyne, supra note 9, at 769 (arguing that the Free Press Clause only 
gives the press equal freedom of speech protection as an individual). 
 73 Stewart, supra note 69, at 631. 
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these entities, with special rights not possessed by the public gener-
ally?  And (3) Who is a journalist and what is “the press”?  There is 
still some misunderstanding about the Court’s responses to these 
questions, not to mention some dissatisfaction with its answers.  
Meanwhile, the arguments presented by the media litigants have 
never been systematically studied but are important to examine, both 
to assess the validity of the criticisms that have been aimed at them, 
and to mine for insights in the ongoing effort to construct a constitu-
tionally sound framework for defining the scope of press freedom 
and the right to gather news.74 
The findings and analysis are presented below in three subsec-
tions corresponding to the general questions above.  The first section 
looks at whether the Court or media litigants have made references 
to particular clauses of the First Amendment and whether they con-
cluded (or proposed, in the case of the litigants) that the Speech and 
Press Clauses be interpreted independently.  The second section 
looks at whether the Court has provided different levels of freedom 
to particular groups or media and whether the media litigants have 
sought separate treatment.  And the last section looks at how the 
Court and litigants have defined the press—either explicitly or by vir-
tue of either the characteristics they emphasize as being journalistic 
or the labels they attach to different media. 
This Article is focused on the “media” or “press” cases decided by 
the Supreme Court between 1971–72 and 2006–07.  In selecting the 
cases, a Westlaw search was conducted of all Supreme Court cases in 
which the phrases “freedom of the press,” “free press,” “press free-
dom,” “speech and press” or “speech or press” appeared in the case 
syllabus, digest, or headnotes.  A second search was conducted for all 
Supreme Court cases reprinted in the Media Law Reporter.75  These 
lists were cross-checked against each other and the combined list was 
cross-checked against lists used by other scholars in previous studies.76 
 
 74 It should be noted that the media litigants’ briefs are not pristine expressions of constitu-
tional argument.  They are written, in part, with tactical goals in mind.  Nevertheless, liti-
gants still do occasionally propose novel theories and challenge hardened orthodoxies in 
their efforts to persuade the Court.  In any case, the point of this study is to evaluate as-
sumptions about the arguments made in the briefs, irrespective of the arguments journal-
ists or their advocates have made in other contexts. 
 75 This is a case reporter in which nearly all decisions relating to the law of the mass media 
are published. 
 76 These include ELIZABETH BLANKS HINDMAN, RIGHTS VS. RESPONSIBILITIES:  THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE MEDIA at app. (1997), and Thomas Alphonse Schwartz, A Reconceptuali-
zation of the First Amendment:  The Burger Court and Freedom of the Press, 1969–1980 
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Applying these search criteria yielded a list of 212 cases.  This list 
was narrowed by eliminating cases that did not involve a media liti-
gant.  “Media” was defined broadly to encompass any medium used 
for communicating to a mass audience.  This included traditional 
outlets, such as radio, television, newspapers, and magazines, but also 
underground publications, cable television, and the Internet.  Not 
every litigant whose speech was expressed through a medium was 
considered a media litigant, however.  Cases involving demonstrators 
using placards or engaging in acts of symbolic speech were not in-
cluded,77 nor were cases involving obscenity or commercial speech.78  
Also eliminated were cases in which the Court issued only a memo-
randum opinion,79 or in which no free speech or press issue was pre-
sented.80  Applying these criteria yielded a final list of eighty cases, 
with an equal number of media briefs.81 
III.  FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
This Part contains summaries and analyses of the court opinions 
and media litigant briefs, with each subsection addressing one of the 
three core questions noted above.  Collectively, they also provide a 
basis for evaluating some of the common assumptions noted at the 
outset of the Article82 that have been made by critics of the media’s 
efforts to secure legal protections. 
Debates over the meaning of the Speech and Press Clauses of the 
First Amendment are often stymied by the parties’ failure to clarify 
basic terms and assumptions.  There are three essential models, how-
ever, that shape most assessments and that are used here to help 
frame this analysis.  The first is an expression model in which the Speech 
and Press Clauses are read together as a collective statement about 
the freedom of all citizens to communicate, whether through speech 
 
(May 1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Illinois University) (on file with 
UMI Dissertation Service). 
 77 This was largely a pragmatic choice designed to produce a final list that was manageable 
but that did not exclude the most salient cases. 
 78 See supra note 77. 
 79 Memorandum opinions are official rulings on the merits of a case, but they are not ac-
companied by a written opinion outlining the Court’s rationale. 
 80 The focus here is not on all legal conflicts involving media, but on those cases that shed 
light on the scope of speech and press freedom. 
 81 Occasionally, more than one media litigant was involved in a case and each party would 
contribute its own brief.  In those cases, the brief written by the first-named media litigant 
was selected.  Those briefs tend to be the most comprehensive, with the other briefs often 
augmenting and referencing them. 
 82 See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
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or through media, and in which all citizens have equal standing to in-
voke those protections.  Under this model, the Press Clause has no 
meaning independent of the Speech Clause, and no protection is 
recognized for newsgathering or other non-expressive acts.  The sec-
ond is an autonomy model in which the Speech Clause is read as pro-
tecting free expression while the Press Clause is understood as a 
shield against more indirect usurpations of the independence of 
communicators.83  This model provides at least some protection 
against, for example, government encroachments into newsrooms or 
interference with source relationships, and its protections are avail-
able to anyone who seeks to gather and report news.  The third ap-
proach is a special-rights model, which parallels the autonomy model 
except that it reserves the Press Clause protections for those commu-
nicators who possess certain professional attributes or institutional af-
filiations. 
A.  Speech Clause v. Press Clause 
The questions posed in this area were aimed at understanding 
what the textual basis has been for the parties’ interpretations of the 
Speech and Press Clauses.  Specifically, have they interpreted the 
clauses independently, or have they evaluated them as expressions of 
a single concept?  And have the parties explicitly or implicitly en-
dorsed the thesis proposed by Justice Stewart in “Or of the Press”?84 
It is commonly asserted85 that the Supreme Court has rejected Jus-
tice Stewart’s argument that the Speech and Press Clauses were in-
tended to be construed separately.86  It is true that the Court has nei-
ther explicitly endorsed Stewart’s thesis nor tied its rulings to the 
 
 83 Another expression of this approach would be to say that the Speech and Press Clauses 
have no independent significance and they merely protect expression, but that in order 
to protect expression, one must also protect the autonomy of communicators from gov-
ernment actions that can intimidate, harass, or otherwise indirectly inhibit expressive ac-
tivity. 
 84 See Stewart, supra note 69. 
 85 See Anthony L. Fargo, The Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential Information in States With-
out Shield Laws, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 241, 252–53 (2002) (observing that the Court’s “ma-
jority noted that Congress was free to create a statutory privilege, and the states were free 
to recognize a privilege through statutes or through interpretations of their own constitu-
tions”). 
 86 See Baker, supra note 28, at 959 (arguing that, although the courts have not explicitly ac-
knowledged such a distinction, an independent meaning for the Press Clause is implicit 
in their rulings and that, in any case, it provides a useful construct for resolving free-press 
controversies). 
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precise language of either clause.87  But it is too much to say the 
Court’s approach and Stewart’s are wholly incongruent, at least with-
out understanding more clearly what Stewart meant. 
Stewart argued that to conjoin the Speech and Press Clauses 
would create a textual redundancy that the Framers did not intend.88  
He therefore proposed that the Speech Clause be read as a shield 
against government restraints of expression while the Press Clause be 
understood as a structural provision designed to protect the press in 
its institutional role as a watchdog of powerful interests.89  So when 
the government compels reporters to divulge their confidential 
sources, for example, it pierces the autonomy of the press and im-
pedes its “constitutional mission,”90 whether or not there is any im-
mediately measurable effect on its speech. 
Stewart’s Yale address seems to provide a blueprint for recogni-
tion of special press rights, but it is ambiguous enough to invite a 
narrower interpretation.  For example, Stewart highlights cases like 
New York Times Co. v. United States (the Pentagon Papers case)91 and 
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo92 as exemplifying his theory.  
But those cases both involved direct government restraints of expres-
sion and can be explained by reference to speech principles alone.  
The only arguably special-rights case described by Stewart in his Yale 
address was Branzburg.  But even the reporter’s privilege (despite its 
unfortunate name) need not be construed as a special right.  Those 
who conceive of it in those terms typically have in mind what Ugland 
and Henderson call an expert definition of the press—one in which 
“journalists are conceived of as a uniquely qualified and clearly iden-
tifiable collection of professionals who serve as agents of the public in 
the procurement and dissemination of news.”93  But most lower courts 
and legislatures have begun to move away from that definition and 
toward a more egalitarian definition of the press “in which all citizens 
are equally equipped and equally free to serve as newsgathering 
 
 87 See infra Part III.A.1.  Note, however, that during the middle part of the twentieth century, 
the Court did emphasize the Press Clause in some cases.  See David A. Anderson, Freedom 
of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 448 (2002) (calling the period between the 1930s and the 
1960s “the heyday of the Press Clause in the Supreme Court”). 
 88 See Stewart, supra note 69, at 633. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 729 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 91 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (striking down an injunction prohibiting the New York Times from 
publishing classified documents obtained by a third party). 
 92 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down a Florida statue giving political candidates a right to 
reply to their critics in any newspaper). 
 93 See Ugland & Henderson, supra note 29, at 246–47. 
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watchdogs.”94  By protecting the underlying function rather than as-
signing those protections to a particular group, the special-rights 
problem is mitigated, if not eliminated.95  And that is the only defini-
tion that seems to be practically and constitutionally workable in an 
era in which anyone can disseminate information to a mass audience. 
Unfortunately, Stewart is not so easily saved by this construction 
because he began his Yale speech by saying he intended to address 
“the role of the organized press”96 and he argued later that historically 
the press was understood as providing “expert scrutiny of govern-
ment.”97  Whether Stewart truly intended to limit Press Clause protec-
tion to the institutional media is not entirely clear, however, because 
his opinions on the Court show no evidence of a desire to confer spe-
cial rights on the press98 or to define the press in ways that discrimi-
nate between mainstream and more peripheral media.99  So it could 
 
 94 Id. at 247. 
 95 See infra notes 150–52 and accompanying text. 
 96 Stewart, supra note 69, at 631 (emphasis added).  Stewart later added that the press is “the 
only organized private business that is given explicit constitutional protection.”  Id. at 633 
(emphasis added). 
 97 Id. at 634 (emphasis added). 
 98 Other than Branzburg, there were only two cases in which Stewart’s opinions could be con-
strued as recognizing special rights, although they need not be interpreted that way.  The 
first was Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), in which Stewart argued in dissent 
that a police search of the offices of a college newspaper was unconstitutional.  Id. at 571 
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (“It seems to me self-evident that police searches of newspaper of-
fices burden the freedom of the press.”).  Much like his Branzburg dissent, Stewart’s opin-
ion in Zurcher was rooted in the Press Clause and was built around an autonomy concept 
that was attentive to the more subtle ways in which government restrictions on non-
expressive acts could collaterally damage expressive ones.  See id. at 570–77.  This could be 
construed as recognition of a special right in that Stewart was suggesting that the press 
status of the searched party would trigger the application of different constitutional stan-
dards.  Indeed, he described Zurcher as a “press” case.  Id. at 571.  But it is not clear that 
Stewart had in mind a set of rights that would only flow to particular organizations, or if 
they would be available to any person or group serving a press function. 
   The other case was Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978), in which the Court up-
held an interlocutory appeal, enjoining a news organization’s attempt to access a federal 
prison facility.  Stewart wrote a concurring opinion insisting that even in providing the 
press with equal access to prisons, some special accommodation must be made for their 
use of newsgathering equipment.  Id. at 17 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment) 
(“[T]erms of access that are reasonably imposed on individual members of the public 
may, if they impede effective reporting without sufficient justification, be unreasonable as 
applied to journalists . . . .”).  But again, it is not clear that Stewart would have limited 
these protections to those in the mainstream media, or if anyone assuming that role and 
using those devices would be eligible.  In the absence of such statements, one cannot 
characterize Stewart as an advocate of a special-rights model, at least not without trying to 
tie in the extrajudicial comments from his Yale speech. 
 99 Indeed, even his dissent in Branzburg is devoid of the kinds of references to the institu-
tional media found in Or of the Press.  Although Stewart, like the Court majority, uses the 
 
  
392 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:2 
 
be that his Yale speech simply reflected his assumption that in 1974 
mainstream journalists were, for all practical purposes, the only peo-
ple who would ever need these protections. 
Although Stewart is perceived to be the key exemplar of the spe-
cial-rights model and a constitutional pathfinder of sorts for the me-
dia litigants, his opinions on the Court actually fit comfortably within 
the autonomy model—a framework that the Court majority has itself 
embraced on occasion.  In Branzburg, for example, the Court ac-
knowledged that “news gathering is not without its First Amendment 
protections,”100 and that “without some protection for seeking out the 
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”101  Similarly, in 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,102 the Court held that the press 
and public have a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials, in 
part to ensure the fairness of those proceedings, but also to indulge 
the information-gathering interests of the attendees.103  So the Court 
cannot be characterized as endorsing a pure expression model when 
it clearly conceives of the First Amendment as protecting some non-
expressive activity.  There are some clear differences between Stew-
art’s approach and the approach of the Court majority, but it is mis-
leading to present them as entirely incompatible.  The same can be 
said of the relationship between the Court and the media litigants. 
1.  U.S. Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court has routinely acknowledged the importance 
of freedom of the press and has distinguished it from freedom of 
speech,104 but it has not directly addressed Stewart’s thesis,105 nor has it 
 
term “newsman,” which some might view as a reference to professional journalists, Stew-
art does not define the term, and he uses it interchangeably with the more generic term 
“reporter.”  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725–52 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
100 Id. at 707. 
101 Id. at 681.  Although the Court has not defined the scope of the right to gather news, by 
acknowledging that the Speech and Press Clauses protect more than the mere expression 
or dissemination of information, the Court has accepted the legitimacy of the autonomy 
model, at least in some fashion. 
102 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
103 Id. at 575 (“In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amend-
ment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning 
to those explicit guarantees.”). 
104 See infra Part III.C.1, discussing the Court’s repeated references to the press’s unique role 
as the public’s proxy. 
105 The Court referenced Stewart’s speech in two of its cases, but only for more general 
propositions.  See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 
575, 585 (1983) (referencing Or of the Press generally to support the proposition that the 
threat of taxes may operate as a censor to check critical comment by the press, undercut-
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declared that the Press Clause has any meaning apart from the 
Speech Clause.  Indeed, the phrase “Press Clause” appeared in only 
five of the cases examined here.106  The only time the Court majority 
used it was in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, but only as part of 
a more general reference to both the “Speech and Press Clauses.”107  
The other four times, the phrase was used by concurring or dissent-
ing Justices,108 only one of whom, Chief Justice Burger, directly ad-
 
ting its role as a restraint on government); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14–15 
(1978) (quoting Or of the Press to reject the assertion that the public and the media have a 
First Amendment right to government information regarding jails and other public facili-
ties).  Stewart’s article is also cited favorably by the dissent in Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 
439, 465 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting), and is referenced without discussion in Dun 
and Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 783 n.8 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting), and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 808 n.8 (1978) 
(White, J., dissenting). 
106 References to the Speech Clause were also rare.  In Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 
U.S. 819, 841 (1995), the Court held that student publications and other printed material 
are protected by the “Speech Clause of the First Amendment,” which, if true, would seem 
to either render the Press Clause a nullity or require an interpretation in which “press” 
connotes either non-expressive behavior (newsgathering) or a distinction between par-
ticular types of journalists.  In City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 
488, 491 (1986), the Court noted that the media litigant’s “complaint alleged that [re-
spondents] had violated the [media litigant’s rights under the] Free Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment.”  And in Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 800 (Burger, C.J., concurring), Chief Jus-
tice Burger referred to the Speech Clause in the context of his argument differentiating it 
from the Press Clause.  See infra notes 109–12 and accompanying text. 
107 514 U.S. 334, 359 (1995) (“When interpreting the Free Speech and Press Clauses, we 
must be guided by their original meaning, for ‘[t]he Constitution is a written instru-
ment.’” (first alteration in original) (quoting South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 
437, 448 (1905))). 
108 In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992), Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence makes general reference to the “Speech and Press Clauses” with-
out discussing the distinctions between them.  Id. at 694, 696, 703 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in judgment).  In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), Justice Powell, in a 
concurring opinion, implied that perhaps the Press Clause has a meaning independent of 
the Speech Clause but he did not elaborate.  Id. at 568 (Powell, J., concurring) (“As I un-
derstand [Justice Stewart’s dissenting] opinion, it would read into the Fourth Amend-
ment, as a new and per se exception, the rule that any search of an entity protected by the 
Press Clause of the First Amendment is unreasonable so long as a subpoena could be 
used as a substitute procedure.”).  Justice Marshall was more explicit in his dissenting 
opinion in Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991), when he argued that a tax scheme 
that treated the cable media differently than other media violated the non-discrimination 
principle of the “Free Press Clause” and suggesting that the purpose of that Clause “‘was 
to preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of public information.’”  Id. at 454–55 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)).  
Still, it is unclear whether Marshall was suggesting that there is an antidiscrimination 
principle uniquely applicable to the press or whether he was merely using press language 
to restate the more general First Amendment presumption against speaker-based dis-
crimination.  See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 579 (striking down state laws 
taxing ink and newsprint, which placed unique burdens on print media). 
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dressed the clause’s constitutional significance.  In his concurring 
opinion in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,109 Burger surveyed 
the history of the Press Clause and concluded that it was not meant to 
be a source of unique protections for the institutional press but was 
meant merely as an extension of the Speech Clause, guaranteeing all 
people the ability to express ideas through “every sort of publication 
which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.”110  Burger also 
appeared to target Stewart directly, arguing, “To conclude that the 
Framers did not intend to limit the freedom of the press to one select 
group is not necessarily to suggest that the Press Clause is redun-
dant.”111  Burger’s Bellotti concurrence was a plain articulation of the 
expression model in that he emphasized the equal right of people to 
communicate through media, without acknowledging any of the less 
obvious ways in which expression and press independence can be 
impaired by government.  It was also a repudiation of the special-
rights model and an example of how that model—and by extension 
Justice Stewart—has been set up as the foil, despite the fact that the 
media litigants have not contended that the Press Clause carves out 
special protections for the institutional media or other discrete 
groups.112 
The Court’s majority has not addressed these issues as squarely as 
Burger did, and its approach has been haphazard.  Instead of relying 
on the Press Clause as the textual hook for its decisions, the Court 
has used an assortment of words and phrases—“the First Amend-
ment,” “freedom of speech and press,” “press freedom” and “freedom 
of the press”—to frame the media litigants’ claims.  These distinc-
tions are not necessarily minor matters of style.  They reflect (or 
could be perceived as reflecting) the Court’s assumptions about the 
 
109 435 U.S. at 799–800 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“The Speech Clause standing alone may 
be viewed as a protection of the liberty to express ideas and beliefs, while the Press Clause 
focuses specifically on the liberty to disseminate expression broadly . . . .  Yet there is no 
fundamental distinction between expression and dissemination.” (footnote omitted)). 
110 Id. at 800 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 
(1938)). 
111 Id. at 799.  Burger added, “The liberty encompassed by the Press Clause, although com-
plementary to and a natural extension of Speech Clause liberty, merited special mention 
simply because it had been more often the object of official restraints.”  Id. at 800.  Al-
though Burger did not name Stewart, his repeated references to the “institutional press” 
and to protections for “a select group” suggest he was aiming his critique at the special-
rights model.  Id. at 799.  Even more conspicuous is his use of the word “redundant,” 
which is likely a reference to Stewart’s admonition that merging the Speech and Press 
Clauses would create a “constitutional redundancy.”  Stewart, supra note 69, at 633. 
112 See infra Part III.B.2. 
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identity of the litigants and the constitutional import of the underly-
ing controversy. 
The Court is clearly uncertain about what restrictions violate free-
dom of speech versus freedom of the press.  It describes Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,113 for example, exclusively in press terms 
even though it is essentially a garden-variety compelled speech case.114  
The fact that the law in question in that case targeted newspapers was 
incidental to the outcome.  Nevertheless, the Court’s opinion—
strangely, written by Chief Justice Burger—never mentions the word 
“speech” and instead emphasizes the importance of media independ-
ence and the ways in which the law in question “violates the guarantees 
of a free press.”115  This has led some, including Justice Stewart, to hold 
Tornillo up as the consummate press case.116  It has also left the im-
pression that perhaps a different constitutional template must be ap-
plied when the target of government restraints is a media or press de-
fendant. 
That might not be the interpretation the Court intended, but it is 
a plausible one in light of the way the Court framed the case.  Even if 
the Court meant only to acknowledge the expressive rights of the 
press and not to either differentiate them from those of other citizens 
or to identify a broader zone of autonomy for the press, that does not 
explain why the Court has addressed the claims of other newspaper 
defendants,117 as well as those of other media defendants,118 as ones 
 
113 418 U.S. 241, 243 (1974) (“The issue in this case is whether a state statute granting a po-
litical candidate a right to equal space to reply to criticism and attacks on his record by a 
newspaper violates the guarantees of a free press.”). 
114 The compelled speech doctrine stands for the principle that government may not force 
someone to speak any more than it can prohibit someone from speaking.  See, e.g., W. Va. 
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down law that compelled 
public school students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance). 
115 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 243 (emphasis added).  There are several similar references in the 
opinion, including the Court’s ultimate declaration of its ruling:  “It has yet to be demon-
strated how governmental regulation of [the editorial] process can be exercised consis-
tent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.”  Id. 
at 258 (emphasis added). 
116 See Stewart, supra note 69, at 633. 
117 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988) (addressing the First 
Amendment violation claims of school newspaper staff members); Seattle Times Co. v. 
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984) (addressing the media’s desire to disseminate informa-
tion “obtained pursuant to a court order that both granted him access to that informa-
tion and placed restraints on the way in which the information might be used”). 
118 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (Internet); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. 
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (cable television); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. 
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (books); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Fal-
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involving freedom of speech, not freedom of the press.  Indeed, the 
Court even addressed CBS v. Democratic National Committee as a speech 
case though it was factually parallel to Tornillo except that the peti-
tioner was a broadcaster instead of a newspaper.119  This cannot be 
explained by simply distinguishing between print and broadcast me-
dia either because the Court characterizes some broadcast cases as 
press cases as well.120  In a number of cases, the Court refers to free-
dom of speech and freedom of press in the same sentence without 
differentiation,121 which could be a deliberate attempt by the Court to 
remain agnostic on the relationship between the two clauses.  It could 
also be an expression-model fusion of the two clauses, although that 
does not explain why the Court in other cases very deliberately em-
phasizes one or the other.122 
The Court’s media decisions do not resolve questions about the 
scope of, and connections between, the Speech and Press Clauses.123  
Based purely on outcomes, the Court’s approach is most akin to the 
expression model outlined by Justice Burger.  But its inconsistent use 
of language and its acknowledgement in Branzburg, Richmond Newspa-
pers, and other cases that the First Amendment protects more than 
just expressive acts, prevents such a clean categorization.  Although it 
has refused to parse the Speech and Press Clauses, the Court’s lin-
guistic imprecision has left considerable doubt as to what the Court 
regards as a violation of freedom of speech versus freedom of the 
press. 
 
well, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (magazines); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (ra-
dio). 
119 412 U.S. 94 (1973).  Note, however, that Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion declares 
that broadcasters “are surely part of the press,” and says that if the courts were to treat pri-
vate media as government actors, “[f]reedom of the press would then be gone.”  Id. at 
133 (Stewart, J., concurring).  Justice Douglas’s opinion concurring in the judgment also 
frames the case as one about freedom of the press.  Id. at 148–70 (Douglas, J., concurring 
in judgment). 
120 See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 497 (1975) (“[T]he protection of free-
dom of the press . . . bars the State of Georgia from making appellants’ broadcast the ba-
sis of civil liability.”). 
121 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 
153 (1979); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 
403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
122 See, e.g., Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987) (“Such official 
scrutiny of the content of publications as the basis for imposing a tax is entirely incom-
patible with the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press.”). 
123 The Court leaves open questions about whether the two clauses either require or permit 
distinctions to be made between litigants based on their actions (e.g., newsgathering ver-
sus expression), their identity (e.g., mainstream media versus peripheral media), both, or 
neither. 
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2.  Media Litigants 
Like the Court, the media litigants have not generally affixed their 
claims to a particular clause of the First Amendment, although a few 
of them have quoted Stewart’s Or of the Press speech or his other state-
ments about the Press Clause.124  In FCC v. League of Women Voters of 
California, the media litigants argued that “the press clause was spe-
cifically included in the Constitution to ensure that the government 
could not convert the communications media into a neutral market 
place of ideas.”125  And in Herbert v. Lando, the litigants made an even 
fuller argument, partially quoting Stewart’s dissent in Houchins v. 
KQED, Inc.: 
[T]he press clause of the First Amendment was no afterthought, no mere 
appendage of the speech clause, but a deeply felt response to the depri-
vations of press liberty that the colonists had witnessed and to which they 
had been subject.  In short, “[t]hat the First Amendment speaks separa-
bly of freedom of speech and freedom of the press is no constitutional 
accident, but an acknowledgement of the critical role played by the press 
in American society.”126 
These were the only two instances in which a litigant made an ex-
plicit attempt to separate the two clauses, although in neither case 
did the litigant build its entire argument around the Press Clause.127  
Indeed, there was only one instance in which a litigant represented 
its claim as being solely about freedom of the press.128  In every other 
case, the litigants based their claims on “the First Amendment,” “free-
 
124 In addition to the references that follow, Stewart’s article was quoted in three other liti-
gant briefs, but not to support the claim that the Press Clause has a separate meaning in-
dependent of the Speech Clause. 
125 Brief for Appellees at 33 n.23, FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 
(1984) (No. 82-912) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stewart, supra note 69, 
at 636). 
126 Brief of Respondents at 55, Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (No. 77-1105) (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (Stewart, J., 
concurring)). 
127 The only other reference to the Press Clause was by the media litigant in Rosenberger who 
argued that its rights were protected by the “‘Speech and Press Clause[s] of the First 
Amendment.’”  Brief for the Petitioners at 2, Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 
(1995) (No. 94-329). 
128 See Brief for Petitioners at 28, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (No. 76-
1484).  This brief does not attempt to define freedom of the press, however, or to explain 
how it is separate from freedom of speech.  Nevertheless, because this case involved a 
First Amendment challenge to the search of a newsroom—that is, it did not involve a di-
rect restraint of expression—the litigants seemed to be working from an autonomy 
model. 
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dom of speech and press,” or some variant that combined the two 
principles.129 
Even though the litigants did not limit their claims to Press Clause 
arguments or even to claims about freedom of the press, they often 
characterized their rights as involving press freedom, even where they 
also claimed a violation of their speech rights.130  Some litigants 
seemed to perceive a benefit in having their rights recognized as 
those of the press.  This was especially common among the periph-
eral media litigants—those using handbills, flyers, newsletters, or un-
derground publications, for example.  Their rights were treated uni-
formly by the Court as only raising free speech concerns,131 but most 
of the peripheral media litigants claimed violations of speech and 
press.132  Still, a few litigants—both peripheral and mainstream—
framed their arguments only in speech terms.133  This could mean 
that they did not see themselves as the press, or it simply could have 
been a strategic decision to avoid antagonizing the Court with claims 
that might be misunderstood as demands for special status.  In any 
case, the litigants did not follow a consistent approach by, for exam-
ple, limiting their free-speech claims to contexts in which their ex-
pressive acts were targeted, or reserving their press-based claims for 
contexts in which their autonomy was targeted.  They were, however, 
less prone than the Court to emphasizing one or the other. 
 
129 These included:  “free speech and press,” “free speech and free press,” “freedom of 
speech and press,” “freedom of speech and freedom of the press,” “freedoms of speech 
and publication,” and “speech and press provisions of the First Amendment.”  Id. 
130 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 12, Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. 
FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (No. 95-124) (arguing that for cable television operators and 
programmers, a restraint of their expression violated the “speech and press provisions of 
the First Amendment”). 
131 See infra Part III.C.1. 
132 See, e.g., Brief of Petitioner at 39, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 
(1995) (No. 93-986); Brief for the Appellee at 24, FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 
U.S. 238 (1986) (No. 85-701); Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellees at 64, USPS v. Council of 
Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (No. 80-608); Brief of Respondents at 13, 
Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (No. 80-795); 
Brief for the Appellants at 21, Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 
(1974) (No. 72-1180); Brief for Petitioner at 16, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 
(1972) (No. 71-492). 
133 See, e.g., Brief of Appellee at 10, United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 
(2000) (No. 98-1682); Brief of Appellees at 1, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 
96-511); Brief for Appellants at 33, Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) 
(No. 95-992); Brief of Petitioners & Cross-Respondents at 12, Int’l Soc. for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (Nos. 91-155, 91-339); Reply Brief of Peti-
tioner at 1, Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (No. 90-1056); Brief of Respondents 
at 20, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (No. 89-645); Brief for Respon-
dent at 11, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (No. 77-528). 
  
Jan. 2009] CONCEPTIONS OF PRESS FREEDOM 399 
 
Most importantly, the litigants’ briefs do not reflect a broad em-
brace of the special-rights model or a desire to separate the Speech 
and Press Clauses.  There were only a couple of exceptions,134 but 
even in those cases the litigants did not seek to secure special rights 
for the institutional press, though, like the Court,135 they highlighted 
the press’s unique democratic role.136  Instead, those cases reflect the 
litigants’ broader commitment to the autonomy model in which jour-
nalists and the public enjoy an equal right to express themselves, and 
in which journalists—that is, all those serving a journalistic func-
tion—are protected against government incursions on their news-
gathering. 
This might appear to be a substantial departure from the Court’s 
approach, but that is less true in terms of rationales than outcomes.  
The Court’s acknowledgement in Branzburg that some pre-expressive 
acts are protected, and its holding in Richmond Newspapers that the 
press and public have a right to acquire information, at least in some 
contexts, suggests that the Court and the litigants have not been 
working from polar frameworks.  By seeking qualified protections 
against newsroom searches,137 inquiries into journalists’ editorial 
processes,138 and forced disclosure of source identities,139 among other 
things, the media litigants were simply finishing the Court’s thought 
in Branzburg that the First Amendment protects more than speech.  
Similarly, the litigants’ pursuit of affirmative rights of access, which 
the Court treated with particular disdain in Pell v. Procunier,140 Saxbe v. 
Washington Post Co.,141 and Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,142 is conceptually 
 
134 See supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text. 
135 See infra Part III.C.1. 
136 The litigants in Houchins emphasized the fact that the rights they were seeking were less 
for their own benefit than “for the benefit of all of us.”  Brief for Respondents at 24, 
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (No. 76-1310) (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 
U.S. 374, 389 (1967)).  And in Herbert, the litigants pointed out that the Framers “knew 
how crucial a role [the press] could play in shaping government.”  Brief of Respondents 
at 51, Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (No. 77-1105); see also infra Part III.C.2. 
137 See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 552 (1978) (addressing media-litigants’ action 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the police officers who searched their 
newspaper). 
138 See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 158 (rejecting protections under the First Amendment for inquir-
ies into journalists’ editorial processes). 
139 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972) (holding that questioning reporters be-
fore a grand jury does not abridge freedom of speech). 
140 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1974) (upholding state prison policy prohibiting media interviews with 
inmates). 
141 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (upholding federal prison policy prohibiting media interviews 
with inmates). 
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compatible with the Court’s argument in Richmond Newspapers that 
the First Amendment safeguards not only expressive freedom, but 
also some of the antecedent acts that make that freedom meaning-
ful.143 
B.  Special Rights 
This section addresses whether and to what extent the Court has 
either established special rights for certain groups or media, or pro-
vided a doctrinal foundation for the recognition of such rights.  More 
importantly, it evaluates the media briefs to see if the litigants have 
urged recognition of special press rights, and if so, on what basis. 
1.  U.S. Supreme Court 
Although the Court’s rulings consistently eschew special rights, its 
rationales and definitions are more nebulous.  The Court addressed 
the question of special press rights at length in Branzburg when it held 
that journalists may not claim immunity against the execution of 
grand jury subpoenas or any other generally applicable require-
ments.144  The Court insisted that the press has neither a “li-
cense . . . to violate valid criminal laws”145 nor “a testimonial privilege 
that other citizens do not enjoy.”146  Justice Stewart, joined by Justices 
Brennan and Marshall, argued in dissent that without at least quali-
fied protection, the government could “annex the journalistic profes-
sion as an investigative arm of government.”147 
 
142 438 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1978) (upholding county prison policy prohibiting news media from 
bringing cameras or recording equipment into jail and from interviewing inmates). 
143 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1980) (recognizing the 
right to attend criminal trials as giving meaning to the protections of the First Amend-
ment). 
144 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682–83 (“It is clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate 
every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or 
criminal statutes of general applicability.  Under prior cases, otherwise valid laws serving 
substantial public interests may be enforced against the press as against others, despite 
the possible burden that may be imposed.”). 
145 Id. at 691. 
146 Id. at 690. 
147 Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  Stewart argued that a qualified privilege would not 
necessarily confer special rights on journalists as individuals, but give the press as an insti-
tution the freedom it needs to serve society’s interest “in a full and free flow of informa-
tion to the public.”  Id.  This instrumental press function, according to Stewart, “underlies 
the Constitution’s protection of a free press.”  Id. at 725–26.  Stewart therefore proposed 
not a regime of special rights for individuals, but protections for an institution whose 
“constitutional mission” is to serve the informational needs of the public.  Id. at 729. 
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The Court, meanwhile, was particularly troubled by the defini-
tional dilemma that recognition of a reporter’s privilege would pre-
sent.  Its decision was mostly rooted in the expression model in that it 
denied protection for pre-expressive activity while also describing 
freedom of the press as a “‘fundamental personal right’ which ‘is not 
confined to newspapers and periodicals,’” but “‘comprehends every 
sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opin-
ion.’”148  Branzburg was the first of several cases in which the Court 
raised the specter of special rights and used it as a basis for rejecting 
the media’s claims.149  The Court in Branzburg essentially says that be-
cause everyone can be a member of the press, the Court cannot rec-
ognize the protection being sought.  But the conclusion does not fol-
low from the premise.  The Court confounds itself by intermingling 
the two key models of the press.  Its premise reflects the egalitarian 
conception of the press and is focused on the functions being per-
formed by those seeking recognition of the privilege.  But the Court’s 
conclusion reverts back to the expert conception of the press by as-
suming that some delineation based on identity (e.g., qualifications, 
characteristics, institutional affiliations) would be necessary to apply 
the privilege. 
In the end, the Court never addresses the fact that a truly egalitar-
ian conception of the press largely solves the special-rights dilemma.  
The Constitution does not assign any rights to particular groups of 
citizens to the exclusion of others, except to the extent that a person 
claiming a right must be engaged in the behavior—or find himself in 
the circumstance—for which the right was established.  To invoke the 
Second Amendment,150 for example, one must own or seek to own a 
weapon.  To invoke the Third Amendment,151 one must own or oc-
 
148 Id. at 704 (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450, 452 (1938)).  In this sense, 
the “press” is merely a channel of communication, not a set of behaviors.  So, when the 
Court emphasizes freedom of the press, it is merely acknowledging the fact that the ex-
pression in question was being disseminated through a particular medium.  That does 
not explain why the Court in other cases suggests that freedom of the press also encom-
passes some non-expressive activity, like gathering news and attending court proceedings.  
See supra notes 137–43 and accompanying text. 
149 See also, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (“It is, therefore, beyond 
dispute that ‘[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the applica-
tion of general laws.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Assoc. Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 
103, 132–33 (1937))); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 165 (1979) (“The rules are appli-
cable to the press and to other defendants alike . . . .”). 
150 U.S. CONST. amend. II (“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”). 
151 U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No Soldier shall . . . be quartered in any house . . . .”). 
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cupy a residence.  To invoke the Sixth Amendment,152 one must be 
charged with a federal crime, and so on.  But these kinds of qualify-
ing criteria are inseparable from the purpose of the underlying right.  
These are rights possessed by everyone, even if only some citizens will 
ever have a need to assert them.  On the other hand, to impose eligi-
bility requirements that are either unrelated or tangentially related to 
the purpose of the right would present a special-rights problem.  Pro-
viding a First Amendment reporter’s privilege only to those who work 
for traditional news organizations, who have college degrees, or who 
work as journalists “for gain or livelihood”153 would arbitrarily exclude 
some whose actions advance the core purposes of the right.  The 
problem is that the litigants have never supported the application of 
such narrow criteria.154  Not only has the Court routinely miscon-
strued the nature of special rights, but also it has subtly left the false 
impression that the litigants have pursued them.155 
The Court addressed the issue of special rights in several other 
cases.  In Pell v. Procunier, the Court rejected the media litigant’s 
claim of a right of access to state prisons for the purpose of interview-
ing specific inmates.156  “The Constitution does not . . . require gov-
ernment to accord the press special access to information,”157 the Court 
wrote.  Justice Stewart authored the majority opinion, and while it 
might appear to contradict his dissent in Branzburg, the two are rec-
oncilable.  Pell involved a claim for recognition of an affirmative right 
of access—that is, a right that compelled the government to act in 
some way to facilitate the claimants’ interests,158 while Branzburg and 
 
152 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed . . . .”). 
153 This language is used in several state shield laws.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(1)(a) 
(2006). 
154 See infra Part III.B.2. 
155 In Branzburg, Zurcher, Houchins, and Cohen, among other cases, the Court set up the main-
stream media litigants as the antagonists by implying that their aim was to appropriate the 
First Amendment for their own purposes.  See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 782 (1978) (“[T]he press does not have a monopoly on either the First 
Amendment or the ability to enlighten.”). 
156 417 U.S. 817, 828 (1974). 
157 Id. at 834 (emphasis added). 
158 The Court has not been entirely consistent with respect to affirmative rights.  In Branz-
burg, the Court said that “news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,” 
which could imply the existence of access rights, although it need not be interpreted that 
way.  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972).  More significantly, the Court recog-
nized First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of access for the press and public to vari-
ous court proceedings.  See supra note 20.  Certainly these conclusions are defensible, but 
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most other cases were about negative rights—that is, shields against 
government interference of some kind.159  The Court’s opinion in Pell 
was less a repudiation of special rights than a rejection of affirmative 
rights.  As Stewart wrote for the Court in Pell: 
It is one thing to say that a journalist is free to seek out sources of infor-
mation not available to [others] . . . .  It is quite another thing to suggest 
that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative duty to 
make available to journalists sources of information not available to 
members of the public generally.160 
In Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., Justice Stewart again wrote for the 
Court and rejected the claims of the media litigants who had chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a federal prison ban on inmate inter-
views.161  Stewart framed the case as one involving special access 
rights.  But because the prison policy did “not place the press in any 
less advantageous position than the public generally,” he found that 
the press had no valid First Amendment claim.162  Justice Powell, 
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurred in part and dis-
sented in part in both Pell and Saxbe, employing the same rationale 
advanced by Stewart in his Branzburg dissent—that freeing the press 
serves larger societal interests in public information.  Powell wrote 
that because universal access is impractical, “[t]he press is the neces-
sary representative of the public’s interest . . . and the instrumentality 
which effects the public’s right.”163  But Powell took this rationale fur-
ther than Stewart, who refused to read the First Amendment as a 
mandate for affirmative rights. 
The last of the prison-access cases was Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,164 in 
which the Court rejected a broadcaster’s claim for a right of access to 
a county jail where a prisoner suicide had occurred.  The Court held 
that “the media have no special right of access to the Alameda County 
Jail different from or greater than that accorded the public gener-
 
it is puzzling that the Court is so dismissive of access claims in some contexts when it has 
embraced them in others. 
159 Stewart explicitly rejected recognition of affirmative rights in his Yale speech.  See Stewart, 
supra note 69, at 636 (“The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act 
nor an Official Secrets Act.”). 
160 417 U.S. at 834.  This was one of several cases in which the Court mischaracterized the 
claims of the media litigants.  The litigants did not demand to be afforded access to in-
formation unavailable to the public.  Instead, they proposed a public right of access, but 
emphasized the acuteness of their interest in light of their social and professional role as 
conduits of public information. 
161 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974). 
162 Id. at 849. 
163 Id. at 864 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
164 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 
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ally.”165  Indeed, neither the press nor the public has any right of ac-
cess to government information, the Court held, at least in this con-
text.166  There may be public policy rationales for permitting access, 
but that is not the province of the judiciary.  The Court wrote:  “We 
must not confuse what is ‘good,’ ‘desirable,’ or ‘expedient’ with what 
is constitutionally commanded by the First Amendment.  To do so is 
to trivialize constitutional adjudication.”167  Justice Stevens, joined by 
Justices Brennan and Powell, dissented in Houchins to argue that the 
case was not really about special rights; it was about a more general 
public right of access.  The fact that the first person to invoke this 
right happened to be a reporter was merely coincidental.168  This was 
essentially how the litigants framed their arguments in Houchins and 
other access cases,169 but the Court implied that the litigants tried to 
separate themselves from the public, not merely in terms of their ca-
pacity to broadly disseminate public information but in terms of their 
entitlement to that information in the first place. 
In addition to these early access cases, the Court applied its bogus 
special-rights framework in several other cases that, like Branzburg, 
raised questions about journalistic autonomy, as opposed to speech 
or access.  In each case, the Court largely applied an expression-
model analysis and rejected the litigants’ claims.  In Zurcher v. Stanford 
Daily,170 the Court held that the First Amendment does not prevent 
police from executing an otherwise valid search of a newsroom just 
because its occupants are “the press.”171  Justice Stewart dissented, ar-
guing that newsroom searches are self-evident violations of “freedom 
of the press”172 that chill speech and undermine reporters’ confiden-
 
165 Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
166 Id. at 15 (“Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a 
right of access to government information or sources of information within the govern-
ment’s control.”). 
167 Id. at 13. 
168 Id. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the litigant’s claim did not “rest on the 
premise that the press has a greater right of access to information regarding prison con-
ditions than do other members of the public” and therefore the litigant should not be 
punished merely because members of the public “have not yet sought to vindicate their 
rights”). 
169 See supra note 160; see also infra Part III.B.2. 
170 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
171 Id. at 565 (“Properly administered, the preconditions for a warrant—probable cause, 
specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and overall 
reasonableness—should afford sufficient protection against the harms that are assertedly 
threatened by warrants for searching newspaper offices.”). 
172 Id. at 571 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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tial source relationships.173  Although Zurcher appears to be a rejection 
of special press rights and a manifestation of the expression model, 
the Court actually embraced the essential argument asserted by the 
litigants:  “A seizure reasonable as to one type of material in one set-
ting may be unreasonable in a different setting”174 and where a sei-
zure targets material “protected by the First Amendment, the re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment must be applied with 
‘scrupulous exactitude.’”175  So, the divide between the Court and the 
litigants in Zurcher was less about the principle of autonomy than 
about the appropriateness of the litigants’ proposed remedy. 
In light of this, one might have expected the Court to have been 
more solicitous the next year in Herbert v. Lando, in which the Court 
held that it does not violate the First Amendment rights of journalists 
to permit libel plaintiffs to inquire into their editorial decision-
making processes when trying to establish actual malice.176  The plain-
tiff in that case, a public figure,177 argued that it would be impossible 
to prove actual malice without seeking to understand what the de-
fendants knew at the time of publication.  The defendants argued 
that without some kind of constitutional shield against such inquiries, 
full and candid discussion would vanish from American newsrooms178 
and the press would lose much of its independence from govern-
ment.179  The litigants’ autonomy argument again was misconstrued 
by the Court as a selfish demand for special rights.  “The rules are 
applicable to the press and to other defendants alike,”180 the Court in-
sisted, making no mention of Zurcher and its recognition of press au-
tonomy as a constitutional principle. 
The Court in Herbert did revisit its decisions in Tornillo and CBS v. 
Democratic National Committee, concluding that they only prevent gov-
 
173 Id. at 571–73.  Stewart argued that the press was not absolutely immune from searches, 
but that the government should be required to first seek the information through a sub-
poena. 
174 Id. at 564 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 
501 (1973)). 
175 Id. (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965)). 
176 441 U.S. 153, 158 (1979). 
177 Public figures suing for libel must prove that the defendant published the allegedly false 
and defamatory statements with actual malice.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 342 (1974). 
178 Brief of Respondents at 35, Herbert, 441 U.S. 153 (No. 77-1105). 
179 Id. at 46 (“One question this case poses is thus whether the same public officials and pub-
lic figures against whom the press—at its best—is to guard are to be permitted to compel 
answers to questions at the heart of the press’s decision-making process regarding what to 
print about them.”). 
180 Herbert, 441 U.S. at 165. 
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ernment interference with media messages; they do not erect an im-
penetrable shield around the press.181  Justice Brennan’s dissent ob-
jected to that idea, noting:  “Through the editorial process expression 
is composed; to regulate the process is therefore to regulate the ex-
pression.  The autonomy of the speaker is thereby compromised.”182  
Brennan urged recognition of a qualified editorial privilege that 
would shield defendants against this form of discovery unless the 
plaintiff first proved the publication was both false and defamatory.183  
Brennan wrote that this privilege should not be conferred upon 
journalists as individuals to prevent interference with their individual 
self-expression.184  Instead, it should be recognized because the de-
fendants are “representatives of the communications media”185 and 
they have a “special and constitutionally recognized role 
of . . . informing and educating the public, offering criticism, and 
providing a forum for discussion and debate.”186 
The Court took a similar approach in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 
holding that journalists who break promises to their sources can be 
sued under the doctrine of promissory estoppel without triggering 
the First Amendment.187  The Court treated this as another demand 
by the litigants for special rights and immunities from generally ap-
plicable laws.188  But the litigants did not base their claim on their 
special identity.  They simply noted that because they revealed the 
 
181 Id. at 166–67.  The Court leaves the impression here that its decisions only prohibit direct 
restraints of expression, but the Court does not mention its statement in Branzburg that 
newsgathering is protected, even though Justice White wrote the majority opinion in both 
cases. 
182 Id. at 190 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  This was a perfect expression of the autonomy model 
in that it acknowledged the indirect effects of government actions or subpoenas while al-
so adding that these threats raise constitutional problems “whether [the] speaker is a 
large urban newspaper or an individual pamphleteer.”  Id. 
183 Id. at 197.  This would be sufficient, he argued, to protect press defendants against abuse 
of the discovery process by plaintiffs. 
184 Id. at 184 n.1 (“So grounded, an editorial privilege might not stop short of shielding all 
speech.”). 
185 Id. at 188. 
186 Id. at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bel-
lotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 (1978)).  It might appear that Brennan was recognizing special 
rights, but, in fact, he was emphasizing the special role played by the press while also rec-
ognizing that it is a role that anyone can play.  See, e.g., infra note 197. 
187 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991). 
188 Id. at 670 (“It is, therefore, beyond dispute that ‘[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no 
special immunity from the application of general laws.  He has no special privilege to invade 
the rights and liberties of others.’  Accordingly, enforcement of such general laws against 
the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against 
other persons or organizations.” (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (citation omit-
ted) (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132–33 (1937))). 
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name of their source in the context of a news story about a matter of 
significant public interest, their First Amendment interests ought to 
be weighed against the plaintiff’s interests.189  Justice Souter and three 
other Justices agreed with the litigants, arguing that “‘[t]here is noth-
ing talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability,’” and that 
such laws can be as suppressive as ones that target content directly.190  
Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion mirrored the arguments of the 
litigants by suggesting that the case was governed by Smith v. Daily 
Mail Publishing Co.,191 which held that truthful speech on matters of 
public interest can only be restricted to serve “a state interest of the 
highest order.”192  The Court, however, ignored the expression issue 
altogether and represented the case as one about media exclusivity. 
Although the Court has generally opposed recognition of special 
rights for the press, it muddled its position on this issue in a series of 
libel cases in the 1970s and 1980s.  The Court used language in these 
cases suggesting that the rights of media defendants are different 
than those of other defendants.  In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., the 
Court wrote, “We expressly leave open the question of what constitu-
tional standard of proof, if any, controls the enforcement of state li-
bel laws for defamatory falsehoods published or broadcast by news me-
dia.”193  Three years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,194 the Court’s 
opinion repeatedly emphasized the interests of “the press and the 
broadcast media.”195  The Court did the same in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 
in which it wrote that “[b]y requiring a showing of fault the Court in 
Gertz sought to shield the press and broadcast media from a rule of strict 
liability.”196  In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, the Court held 
“that the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false 
 
189 Brief of Respondent at 29, Cohen, 501 U.S. 663 (No. 90-634). 
190 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 677 (Souter, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 901 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
191 443 U.S. 97 (1979). 
192 Id. at 103.  Blackmun also insisted that Cohen was about expression, not special rights, and 
that “[n]ecessarily, the First Amendment protection afforded respondents would be 
equally available to nonmedia defendants.”  Cohen, 501 U.S. at 673 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). 
193 403 U.S. 29, 44 n.12 (1971) (emphasis added). 
194 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
195 Id. at 337. 
196 424 U.S. 448, 465 (1976) (emphasis added).  See also Cox Broad. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 
499 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining that in Gertz the Court “held that the First 
Amendment prohibits the States from imposing strict liability for media publication of al-
legedly false statements that are claimed to defame a private individual” (emphasis add-
ed)). 
  
408 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:2 
 
cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant 
for speech of public concern.”197  Four years later, in Milkovich v. 
Lorain Journal Co., the Court wrote, “we think Hepps stands for the 
proposition that a statement on matters of public concern must be 
provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation 
law, at least in situations . . . where a media defendant is involved.”198  
The next year, however, the Court described a libel case involving The 
New Yorker as a free-speech case, with no reference to the press or any 
special protections that might inhere in such a characterization.199 
Whether or not the Court intended to, or in fact did, confer spe-
cial rights on the press,200 it has never disavowed any of the media-
specific language from its libel decisions.201  That is certainly some-
thing the Court needs to revisit.  But much more consequential is the 
fact that the Court has not only misconceived the nature of special 
rights, it has repeatedly mischaracterized the claims of the media liti-
gants as demands for special rights.  This has very clearly affected the 
outcomes of these cases, and it is not impossible to imagine that it has 
also shaped public assessments of the press and the legitimacy of 
their legal claims. 
 
197 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (emphasis added).  Note that Justice Brennan wrote separately 
in Hepps to emphasize his view that the libel principles established by the Court are equal-
ly applicable to media and non-media defendants.  Id. at 779–80 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). 
198 497 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1990) (emphasis added). 
199 See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 523 (1991) (“Here, we reject any 
suggestion that the incremental harm doctrine is compelled as a matter of First Amend-
ment protection for speech.” (emphasis added)). 
200 The Court has not found a constitutional defect in legislative schemes that provide subsi-
dies or other benefits to the media.  See, e.g., L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g 
Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999) (finding constitutional a state records statute that gave news 
organizations and others access but did not permit access for commercial requesters); 
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (holding that it does not violate the First 
Amendment for the government to apply its generally applicable sales tax requirements 
to cable television services alone while exempting the print media). 
201 C. Edwin Baker points out that, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 
U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985), a majority of the Justices (four dissenting Justices and one con-
curring Justice) rejected the application of different libel criteria to a non-media defen-
dant.  Baker, supra note 28, at 957.  That is true but it does not settle the issue, particu-
larly in light of the reference just noted from Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19–20, which was 
written four years after Dun & Bradstreet in a seven-member majority opinion.  Individual 
Justices have repudiated the special-rights rhetoric from the libel cases, but the Court ma-
jority has never addressed it. 
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2.  Media Litigants 
The media litigant briefs largely reflect an autonomy-model of the 
First Amendment, which is not built around the special status or iden-
tity of the claimants but around the functions they perform.  It is also 
a model that recognizes the threats posed to journalistic autonomy by 
regulations targeting some non-expressive activity.  There were some 
instances in which the litigants emphasized their press credentials or 
highlighted the important social role of the press.  But that is not to 
say that they sought to position themselves atop some constitutional 
pecking order. 
It is possible that some of the litigants thought they might derive 
some benefit from being viewed as “the press” and that it would be a 
factor in the Court’s constitutional calculus.  Because the Court in 
some cases deliberately emphasized freedom of the press rather than 
freedom of speech,202 it is understandable that some litigants might 
have hoped for some special allowance, even though it was not some-
thing they explicitly sought.  Indeed, the media litigants often made 
it clear that they were not seeking recognition of a separate sphere of 
protections for the institutional media203 and that the rights they were 
pursuing were not for their own benefit but for the benefit of the 
public.204 
The closest the litigants came to making special-rights claims was 
in the three prison-access cases.205  The media litigants in these cases 
occasionally employed some of the rhetoric associated with an expert 
conception of the press.  In Pell v. Procunier, for example, they argued 
that “excluding the press wrongly discriminates against them and the 
constitutional interest they represent.  Indeed, the First Amendment 
actually grants them a preferred status, and discriminations which heav-
ily burden First Amendment values are especially reprehensi-
ble . . . .”206  The litigants in Saxbe mirrored some of these arguments 
 
202 See, e.g., Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Cox Broad. Corp. v. 
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
203 See, e.g., Brief for the Appellee at 69, FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 
(1986) (No. 85-701) (“The liberty of the press secured by the First Amendment is not the 
special province of the traditional ‘institutional press,’ but is a fundamental right which 
comprehends every sort of publication.”). 
204 See infra note 260. 
205 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); 
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
206 Brief of Appellants at 11–12, Pell, 417 U.S. 817 (No. 918).  This might be misleading in 
the sense that the litigants might simply have been suggesting that press freedom is af-
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by highlighting the “unique constitutional status of those who inform 
the public”207 and the “unique expertise” the press has in “determin-
ing what matters are newsworthy and what interviews are needed in 
order to inform the public.”208  Because of this expertise, the litigants 
in Houchins v. KQED, Inc. contended, some differential access can be 
afforded the press without upsetting the Constitution:  “Freedom ‘of 
the press’ need not be defined in all circumstances by the rights of 
the public at large.”209  The litigants in each of these cases later turned 
to the familiar arguments, endorsed by some of the Justices, that 
press access—even “somewhat different” access210—is required not to 
serve the individual interests of journalists, but to facilitate their abil-
ity to deliver newsworthy information to the public. 
This is an important principle underlying the litigants’ claims in 
access cases, where their arguments often seemed less about constitu-
tional hierarchies than about simple efficiencies.  Specifically, they 
wanted the Court to recognize that with finite space and opportuni-
ties for access, giving priority access to a journalist over a non-
journalist would yield greater social benefits.  Even though their in-
terests and their intellectual capacities might be identical, the jour-
nalist is more likely seeking access for the purpose of communicating 
to the public and is likely to have access to more robust channels of 
communication.  So the litigants would have likely acknowledged, 
and in some cases did acknowledge, that anyone can be a journalist, 
but that is different from saying everyone is a journalist.  And when a 
government official is faced with access requests from otherwise iden-
tically situated claimants, there are sound policy reasons for giving 
preference to the journalist.  The litigants perhaps crossed the line, 
however, in suggesting that this preference is constitutionally man-
dated, and that differential access is permissible because of journal-
ists’ unique expertise. 
Still, these indefinite references, which are limited to a couple of 
early cases in the somewhat anomalous access-to-places context,211 
 
forded preferential (that is, explicit constitutional) recognition, not that individual 
claimants are preferred over others serving similar ends. 
207 Brief for Respondents at 28 n.8, Saxbe, 417 U.S. 843 (No. 73-1265). 
208 Id. at 67. 
209 Brief for Respondents at 43, Houchins, 438 U.S. 1 (No. 76-1310). 
210 Id. at 42. 
211 These cases are unlike most in that they are complicated by the commingling of policy 
and constitutional arguments and by the conjunction of special-rights and affirmative-
rights issues. 
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provide sparse evidence of a campaign for special rights.212  The liti-
gants were much more magnanimous in other cases, in which they 
made no distinctions between particular types of journalists or be-
tween journalists and the press.  In Richmond Newspapers, for example, 
the litigant urged the Court “to recognize a First Amendment right of 
members of the public to attend criminal trials,”213 which is a phrasing 
repeated in other access cases not involving prisons.214 
The same was true in cases involving non-expressive activity, where 
the litigants sought rights that were unique to the press, but with the 
press defined in egalitarian terms.  In Herbert, they urged the Court to 
provide First Amendment protection against inquiries into editorial 
decision-making, but they did not demand that it be confined to 
mainstream media or to journalists of a particular order.215  Likewise, 
in Zurcher the litigants did not rest their claim on the right of the 
press to immunity from government searches, but proposed a 
broader right that would provide protections whenever a search “af-
fects freedom of speech or press.”216  Herbert and Zurcher are therefore 
quintessential autonomy-model cases in that the litigants emphasized 
a neutral principle that transcends identity.  It might appear that the 
media litigants in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. sought special protections 
by arguing that the government should not be able to enforce a gen-
erally applicable law against the press where it would prevent them 
from communicating newsworthy information to the public about an 
upcoming election.217  But the thrust of their argument was that the 
government should not be permitted to interfere with anyone’s ability 
 
212 See, e.g., Houchins, 438 U.S. 1.  The litigants did not seek preferential access; they simply 
argued that the government could not use its desire for neutrality as a basis for denying 
access altogether.  In other words, the government could not simply shut down access al-
together.  Through this argument, the litigants also sought judicial recognition of af-
firmative rights, which the Court has recognized in other contexts.  See supra note 20. 
213 Brief of Appellants at 27, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) 
(No. 79-243) (emphasis added). 
214 See, e.g., Supplemental Brief of Petitioners, El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 
U.S. 147 (1993) (No. 92-949); Brief of Petitioner on the Merits, Press-Enter. Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1985) (No. 84-1560); Brief for Petitioner on the Merits, Press-
Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (No. 82-556); Reply Brief of Appellant, 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (No. 81-611); Brief of Ap-
pellants, Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981) (No. 79-1260); Brief of Appellants, 
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555 (No. 79-243); Brief of Petitioner, Gannett Co. v. De-
Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (No. 77-1301); Brief for Respondent, Nixon v. Warner 
Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (No. 76-944). 
215 Brief for Respondents, Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (No. 77-1105). 
216 Brief for Respondents at 13, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1977) (Nos. 76-
1484, 76-1600) (emphasis added). 
217 Brief of Respondent, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (No. 90-634). 
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to disseminate truthful information of public interest,218 and that First 
Amendment interests cannot be ignored merely because the law be-
ing enforced is generally applicable.219 
There were some hints of special-rights rhetoric by media litigants 
in the libel cases, but these were probably attempts by the litigants to 
mirror the Court’s linguistic patterns.  In Firestone, the litigant de-
scribed the holding from Gertz as one preventing liability without 
fault in libel actions against “a member of the ‘press.’”220  The litigant 
also argued that the Court had “long emphasized” that the role of the 
press in informing the public requires “maximum freedom and special 
protection.”221  And in Masson, the litigant referenced the extent to 
which libel plaintiffs could recover damages from “the press” but did 
not expand on this.222  It is important to emphasize, however, that in 
all other libel cases, including Hepps, the litigants broke from the 
Court and framed their claims purely as matters of free speech.223 
Despite these occasional references, and despite the common al-
lusions to the unique role and function of the press,224 the media liti-
gants did not demand recognition of special rights.225  The evidence 
gathered from the briefs thus does not support the more general ac-
cusation of media exceptionalism, much less an attempt to exalt the 
rights of particular segments of the press.226  Whether or not these de-
scriptions accurately characterize the out-of-court statements of jour-
nalists and their advocates, they are not reflected in the briefs filed 
with the Court. 
 
218 Id. at 29. 
219 Id. at 34–36.  The litigants note that laws governing libel, privacy, and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress are all generally applicable, yet the Court has subjected their 
application to some First Amendment limitations. 
220 Brief for Petitioner at 16, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1975) (No. 74-944) (quot-
ing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347–48 (1974)). 
221 Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
222 Brief for Respondents at 23–24, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 
(1990) (No. 89-1799). 
223 See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 25, Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1985) 
(No. 84-1491). 
224 See infra Part III.C.2. 
225 Indeed, even in cases in which the Court emphasized press autonomy or freedom of the 
press, the litigants often used more neutral language and relied on more traditional ar-
guments. 
226 This is not to say that the litigants made no distinction between the press and the public.  
They did seek some rights that would be available only to the press.  But because their 
claims were coupled with an egalitarian conception of the press, the litigants’ approach 
did not exclude members of the public who might seek to serve the same journalistic 
purposes. 
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C.  The Role and Identity of the Press 
This section addresses the ways in which the parties defined “jour-
nalists” and “the press” and how they distinguished them from other 
people and institutions.  Unlike the earlier sections, which looked at 
how the parties characterized the underlying claims, this section looks 
at how they framed the identity and journalistic aims of the claimants. 
1.  U.S. Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court has not explicitly defined either “journalist” 
or “the press.”  Of course, it deliberately skirted the issue in Branzburg 
after refusing to recognize a reporter’s privilege.227  But even in its li-
bel rulings, where the Court implied that the press might possess 
unique constitutional protections,228 it acted as if the meaning of “the 
press” was self-evident. 
The Court’s conceptions of “journalist” and “the press” can poten-
tially be discerned by noting the types of people and institutions to 
which the Court has applied those terms.  Unfortunately, the Court’s 
approach has been wildly inconsistent.  Despite its statement in Bran-
zburg that “liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer 
who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large 
metropolitan publisher,”229 the Court’s other statements and charac-
terizations are far less populist.  The Court has consistently described 
traditional, mainstream media organizations as the press, but it has 
not done the same for the peripheral media.  In all cases involving 
mainstream magazines and daily newspapers, the Court operated 
from the assumption that those organizations are part of the press 
and that their claims involved either “freedom of the press” or 
“speech and press.”  The same was true in cases involving the main-
stream broadcasters230 and cable programmers and operators.231 
 
227 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972). 
228 See supra notes 193–99 and accompanying text. 
229 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704. 
230 See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 382 (1984) (“[T]he press, 
of which the broadcasting industry is indisputably a part, carries out a historic, dual re-
sponsibility in our society . . . .” (citation omitted)); see also Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 
U.S. 469, 497 (1975) (“[T]he protection of freedom of the press . . . bars the State of 
Georgia from making appellants’ broadcast the basis of civil liability.”). 
231 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (“There can be no dis-
agreement on an initial premise:  Cable programmers and cable operators . . . are enti-
tled to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment.” (em-
phasis added)); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 
727, 815 (1996) (“[C]able operators engage in speech by providing news, information, 
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Despite its famous platitude about the virtuous “lonely pamphle-
teer,”232 the Court has not been willing to endow communicators us-
ing less traditional media with the label “the press,” nor has it charac-
terized their rights as involving “freedom of the press.”  The Court 
has analyzed these as speech cases,233 despite some occasional refer-
ences by dissenting or concurring Justices to “the press” or “freedom 
of the press.”234  The different characterizations of mainstream versus 
peripheral media defendants suggests that the Court is employing—
though certainly not carefully articulating—a more corporate or ex-
pert conception of the press than is implied by its egalitarian state-
ments in Branzburg.  In each of these cases, the media litigant’s rights 
were upheld.235  At the very least, this creates some doctrinal confu-
sion, even though the disparities are at the definitional level rather 
than the decisional level, and are therefore less confounding in terms 
of outcomes. 
The discrepancies between mainstream and peripheral media 
cases might make sense if the Court had simply been seeking to draw 
 
and entertainment to their subscribers and . . . they are part of the press.” (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991) (“Cable television 
provides to its subscribers news, information, and entertainment.  It is engaged in 
‘speech’ under the First Amendment, and is, in much of its operation, part of the 
‘press.’”).  In three other cable cases, however, the Court recognized the First Amend-
ment rights of cable operators, but focused solely on their expressive or speech rights 
without specifically mentioning “the press.”  See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 
Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); City of 
L.A. v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986). 
232 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704. 
233 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (involving restrictions 
on dissemination of anonymous campaign literature); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 
484 U.S. 260 (1988) (addressing censorship of stories about divorce and teen pregnancy 
in high school newspaper); Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 
640 (1981) (entailing the distribution of sectarian literature at the Minnesota State Fair); 
Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (involving a libel action 
against a union newsletter for referring to claimants as “scabs”); Papish v. Bd. of Curators 
of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (pertaining to restrictions on an underground 
college publication criticizing the police); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) 
(addressing the restraint of handbills urging people to attend anti-war rally); Org. for a 
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (involving the distribution of leaflets accusing 
real estate broker of fraud and discrimination).  It should be noted that there was noth-
ing about the content of the messages being disseminated in these peripheral media that 
distinguished these cases from others.  Each case involved what was arguably core speech. 
234 See, e.g., McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 284 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Old Dominion Branch, 418 U.S. at 288 n.2 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring); Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 573 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
235 One exception, not mentioned above, was Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), in 
which the Court upheld a law limiting the distribution of literature near a polling place 
on the day of an election. 
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a line between dissemination (speech, distribution) and newsgather-
ing (access, autonomy).236  In several cases involving the dissemina-
tion of content in mainstream media, the Court did address the First 
Amendment claims as involving free speech, not free press,237 and all 
of the peripheral media cases involved expression issues.  But the 
Court does not follow a consistent pattern, and goes out of its way in 
some expression cases to identify a litigant as “the press” or to charac-
terize its claim as one involving freedom of the press.238 
What is it, then, that distinguishes the press?  The Court is un-
clear.  It regularly highlights the unique social role of the press—how 
it monitors the abuses of government, keeps the public informed, 
provides a vehicle for the exchange of ideas and enables the public’s 
self-governing tasks, which subtly suggests a certain regularity of 
communication and perhaps a kind of expertise that connotes an ex-
pert conception of the press.  The Court also implies that an organi-
zation’s or individual’s status as a “media defendant” is relevant in de-
termining the scope of its constitutional rights,239 and that only 
certain communicators or media organizations are capable of making 
claims involving freedom of the press.  Yet its more explicit state-
ments affirm the idea that the rights of the press extend no farther 
than those of the public240 and that the lonely pamphleteer is as much 
“the press” as is a large daily newspaper. 
The Court has been equally imprecise in its use of the terms “jour-
nalist,” “reporter,” and “newsman,” but it has been more consistent in 
 
236 All of the peripheral-media cases were, after all, about expression issues, not access or 
autonomy. 
237 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (involving the restriction of indecent content 
on the Internet); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (regarding a civil 
suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on a parody advertisement pub-
lished in a magazine); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (pertaining to a re-
striction on indecent content broadcast by a public radio station). 
238 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 664 (1991) (stating that the First 
Amendment does not immunize the press from a promissory estoppel cause of action 
based on a breach of promise); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768 
(1986) (finding that the burden of proving the falsity of allegedly defamatory speech 
cannot be placed on the press); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974) 
(giving protection to the press from liability in defamation cases when a public issue is 
discussed, absent proof of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth); Miami 
Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding that a state statute allow-
ing for “right of reply” in newspapers violated freedom of the press); see also supra notes 
230–31. 
239 See supra Part III.B.1. 
240 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (“It has generally been held that 
the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access 
to information not available to the public generally.”). 
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application.241  The Court uses these terms in a matter-of-fact way, ap-
parently assuming that whatever meaning it ascribes to them is shared 
by their audience.  These terms are not used in every case involving 
the press or media.  Their application is narrower.  Not every em-
ployee of a media organization is described as a journalist, for exam-
ple.  The Court generally characterizes people as journalists or re-
porters only when they publish or broadcast information of public 
significance242 or when they seek and gather such information,243 and 
even then only if they work in mainstream media. 
Finally, the Court suggests that a journalist is someone who serves 
as a watchdog and is an agent of the public.  The Court says journal-
ists and the news media serve as the “‘eyes and ears’ of the public, 
[and] can be a powerful and constructive force, contributing to re-
medial action in the conduct of public business.”244  Because “[n]o 
individual can obtain for himself the information needed for the in-
telligent discharge of his political responsibilities,”245 journalists and 
the news media play a “special and constitutionally recognized 
role . . . in informing and educating the public.”246  This is the type of 
language the Court routinely uses, and it suggests a traditional defini-
tion of journalists—one that mirrors the widely recognized Wood-
ward-and-Bernstein archetype.247  Yet in other cases, the Court has 
said that the press “does not have a monopoly on either the First 
 
241 During the mid-1980s the Court was more likely to use the term “media” as opposed to 
“the press” in referring to the litigants.  This was probably just an attempt to acknowledge 
the parallels between print media, on one hand, and broadcast, cable, and Internet me-
dia on the other.  Similarly, in referring to reporters, the Court used the archaic term 
“newsman” in Branzburg.  But in subsequent decisions, it used “journalist” and occasion-
ally “reporter.”  In no case was the meanings of these terms specifically examined, how-
ever. 
242 See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 499 (1991) (“The First Amend-
ment protects . . . journalists who write about public figures . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
243 See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691 (noting that by rejecting the reporter’s privilege, the 
Court was not seeking to restrain the “quality of information reporters may seek to acquire, 
nor . . . threaten the vast bulk of confidential relationships between reporters and their 
sources” (emphases added)). 
244 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978). 
245 Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
246 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 (1978). 
247 The Court’s characterizations of the press need not be interpreted as embracing an ex-
pert conception, but because the Court uses this language in cases involving mainstream 
media, whose claims they characterize as being about freedom of the press, and because 
the Court generally does not use this language in cases involving peripheral-media liti-
gants whose cases are presented as ones involving freedom of speech, the Court creates 
unnecessary confusion. 
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Amendment or the ability to enlighten,”248 and that “[t]he informa-
tive function asserted by representatives of the organized press . . . is 
also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic re-
searchers, and dramatists.  Almost any author may quite accurately 
assert that he is contributing to the flow of information to the pub-
lic . . . .”249  The Court implies that journalists are no different than 
other communicators, at least in their expressive or informative func-
tions.  This begs the question whether they are different from others 
in their newsgathering or investigative functions.  The Court has sug-
gested that they are, but at the same time has refused to provide them 
with any protections—other than access to the courts, which is a right 
that they share with the public—that are uniquely tied to that task. 
There are several problems with the Court’s conceptions of jour-
nalists and the press.  The Court emphasizes the unique role played 
by the press in serving as a check on the exercise of power.  Yet the 
Court on many occasions has defined media organizations as the 
press when they do not necessarily serve that function. 
Cable television is the clearest example.  Cable television system 
operators, though exercising some editorial discretion in selecting 
the menu of channels they offer to subscribers, do not serve a check-
ing function, at least not directly.  They provide a vehicle through 
which this information reaches the public, but they usually produce 
none of their own content.  Perhaps these functions warrant First 
Amendment protection, but to the extent that they serve a checking 
function, their role is more indirect than traditional news organiza-
tions, or even intrepid bloggers or pamphleteers.  The Court declares 
that certain media are the press and that they are protected as such, 
but if the press is defined as any organization that communicates in-
formation, that hardly distinguishes it from other institutions. 
Using that criterion, it also makes little sense to characterize pub-
lishers of pamphlets, newsletters, and student newspapers as only 
speakers and not also the press.  In short, the Court needs to make 
clear what rights the press possesses qua press.  If none, then the 
Court should abandon its exhaustive chronicling of the press’s sto-
ried role as the nation’s bulwark of liberty, or at least make clear that 
those are functions that any motivated citizen can perform. 
 
248 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 782. 
249 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 408, 705 (1972). 
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2.  Media Litigants 
Like the Court, no media litigant has ever proposed a specific 
definition of “the press.”  Nevertheless, many litigants have deliber-
ately presented themselves to the Court as the press, perhaps hoping 
or assuming this would enhance their claims to constitutional protec-
tion.  In Herbert v. Lando, the media litigants insisted that although 
CBS and the “60 Minutes” staff were broadcasters, they were also the 
press, a point the media litigants believed had not been and could 
not be disputed.250  Other cases reflect this tendency as well.251  The 
Court was inconsistent in its characterizations of the electronic media 
litigants, but the litigants themselves made more predictable efforts 
to position themselves as the press,252 although this was not always the 
case.253 
The peripheral media litigants were particularly determined to 
convince the Court of their press status.  Although the Court uni-
formly characterized these litigants’ claims as only involving speech, 
 
250 Brief of Respondents at 26 n.1, Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (No. 77-1105). 
251 See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 21–22, Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 
(1987) (No. 85-1370) (arguing that newspapers and magazines are both instruments of 
the press); Brief for Petitioner at 32, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85) (arguing that 
“[p]etitioner is a member of the press” by virtue of being an investigative reporter for a 
newspaper).  These could simply have been attempts by the media litigants to distinguish 
themselves from other businesses and institutions by emphasizing the fact that they en-
gage, as part of their operations, in expressive activity, and in doing so, are covered by the 
First Amendment.  These need not be interpreted, in other words, as attempts by the liti-
gants to claim broader immunities. 
252 See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 21, Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) 
(No. 93-44) (“Sections 4 and 5 deliberately interfere with . . . the editorial functions of 
members of the press . . . .”); Brief for Respondent at 29, City of L.A. v. Preferred 
Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986) (No. 85-390) (“City’s desire to manage a medium of 
the press is improper.”); Brief for Appellees at 38, FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 
468 U.S. 364 (1984) (No. 82-912) (“There can be no doubt that broadcasting falls within 
the First Amendment’s protection against governmental abridgement of freedom of 
speech and the press.”); Brief for Respondent at 52, FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 
U.S. 689 (1979) (Nos. 77-1575, 77-1648, 77-1662) (“[C]able systems should be accorded 
the same First Amendment rights as newspapers . . . .”). 
253 Several electronic media litigants focused on their speech rights and did not seek to 
characterize themselves as the press.  See Brief of Appellee at 21, United States v. Playboy 
Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (No. 98-1682) (alleging that limited television 
broadcasting privileges for sexually explicit programs is an unconstitutional restraint of 
free speech); Brief of Appellees, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-511) (dis-
cussing indecency statutes as an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech in the con-
text of the Internet); Brief for Appellants at 3–4, Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 
180 (1997) (No. 95-992) (maintaining that mandatory carriage requirements for broad-
cast television are regulations that burden free speech); Brief for Respondent at 34, FCC 
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (No. 77-528) (arguing that censoring airwaves re-
stricts freedom of expression). 
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the litigants often sought to persuade the Court that they were no dif-
ferent, in function if not form, than the mainstream press and that 
their rights under the First Amendment should parallel those of tra-
ditional newspapers, magazines, and broadcast outlets.  In FEC v. 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, for example, the media litigant argued 
that a pro-life newsletter should be protected as a matter of “[t]he 
liberty of the press” to the same extent as “the traditional institutional 
press.”254  It argued that the restriction in question “would silence a 
publication more akin to the newspapers circulated at the time the 
First Amendment was written than the publications now printed by 
media conglomerates.”255  In USPS v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 
the media litigant argued that pamphlets and leaflets “fall within the 
purview of the free press protections,”256 and most other peripheral 
media litigants made similar arguments.257 
The characteristics that media litigants identified as defining the 
press and its social role paralleled those highlighted by the Court.  
The litigants portrayed themselves as exercising editorial control,258 
communicating information of public significance relevant to the 
public’s self-governing tasks,259 “bar[ing] the secrets of govern-
 
254 Brief for Appellee at 69, FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (No 85-
701) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
255 Id. at 70–71. 
256 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 62, USPS v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 
114 (1981) (No. 80-608). 
257 See, e.g., Brief of Petitioner at 40, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 
(1995) (No. 93-986) (describing the case as one involving speech and press, and describ-
ing political pamphlets and leaflets as “‘the poor man’s printing press’” (quoting Harry 
Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum:  Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 30)); 
Brief of Respondents at 4, Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (No. 
86-836) (arguing that student newspapers are the press); Brief of Respondents at 13–14, 
Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (No. 80-795) 
(describing a religious pamphleteering case as one involving “freedoms of speech, press, 
religious exercise, association, and assembly”); Brief for Respondents at 15, Lloyd Corp. v. 
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (No. 71-492) (arguing that pamphlets warrant press protec-
tions).  There were a few peripheral-media litigants who focused solely on their speech 
rights.  See Brief of Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 13–14, Int’l Soc. for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 830 (1992) (Nos. 91-155, 91-339) (arguing that reli-
gious literature in airports is a permissible form of free speech); Brief of Respondent at 2, 
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (No. 90-1056) (advocating that the prohibition 
of political literature in polling places is a burden on the right to free speech); Brief for 
Petitioners at 10–11, Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (No. 135) (ar-
guing that pamphlets qualify for constitutional protections of free speech). 
258 See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 30, Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. 622 (No. 93-44) (argu-
ing that the laws in question “interfere[] with the editorial functions of the press”). 
259 See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 22, Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (No. 87-329) (say-
ing that it is “the responsibility of the press to report” information regarding the commis-
sion of a crime involving actions of the government); Brief of Nat’l Citizens Comm. for 
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ment,”260 “expos[ing] abuses of power,”261 and “engaging the public in 
a ‘dialogue in ideas.’”262  Furthermore, journalists and the press do 
these things not for their own sake, but in serving as the “agent or 
proxy of the public.”263  Like the Court then, the media litigants had a 
vision of a journalist that valued the watchdog function and that in-
volved more than the mere dissemination of content (i.e., speech).  
Unlike the Court, however, the litigants would have secured addi-
tional protections against government restraints of press autonomy 
and access. 
In addition, the media litigants, collectively, were much more 
faithful to the egalitarian, lonely-pamphleteer conception of the press 
than was the Court.  The Court reserved the press label for main-
stream media, while the litigants saw themselves as essentially co-
equals.  The mainstream litigants made no attempts to exclude 
smaller media by urging recognition of ranks or tiers,264 and the pe-
ripheral media litigants were nearly unanimous in emphasizing the 
commonalities among media and among communicators.  As the liti-
gants wrote in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., “The liberty of 
the press secured by the First Amendment is not the special province 
of the traditional ‘institutional press,’ but is a fundamental right 
which comprehends every sort of publication.”265 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Despite thirty-five years of litigation and legislative action, the law 
of newsgathering is still a contested and unsteady terrain in which 
there are only a handful of loosely formed theoretical and doctrinal 
 
Broad. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15, CBS Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 
367 (1981) (Nos. 80-207, 80-213, 80-214) (“[B]roadcasters have long had some responsi-
bility to disseminate political speech.”). 
260 Brief of Appellant at 24, Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (No. 
76-1450) (quoting N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., con-
curring)). 
261 Brief for Respondent at 16, City of L.A. v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986) 
(No. 85-390). 
262 Brief for Appellees at 33, FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984) 
(No. 82-912) (quoting Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547 (1976)). 
263 Brief for Respondents at 36, Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (No. 73-1265). 
264 See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 63, USPS v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 
453 U.S. 114 (1981) (No. 80-608) (“The First Amendment was intended by the Founding 
Fathers to be available to all, not merely to those who can bear great financial burdens 
and project their press product in an imposing cover.”). 
265 Brief for Appellee at 69, FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (No. 85-
701). 
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anchors.  In the face of these ambiguities, both mainstream and pe-
ripheral journalists have urged lower courts to clarify and enlarge the 
Supreme Court’s newsgathering jurisprudence.  But those efforts 
have often been derailed by mistrustful judges and lawmakers, many 
of whom no doubt share the public’s disapproval of press perform-
ance266 and its pernicious assumption that mainstream journalists re-
gard the First Amendment as a special manifest of rights that has 
been set aside for, as Spiro Agnew put it, a “‘tiny and closed fraternity 
of privileged men.’”267 
The results of this analysis show no support, however, for the abid-
ing accusation that the media litigants have claimed an elite or pre-
ferred constitutional position, or that they have sought judicial rec-
ognition of a framework of special rights.  It is true that the litigants 
made some distinctions between speech and press, and between the 
press and public.  But they linked their claims to an egalitarian con-
ception of the press in which the distinctions among communicators 
were made on the basis of function, not identity. 
The portrayal of mainstream journalists as disciples of Justice 
Stewart who have sought to co-opt the Press Clause is still part of the 
historical narrative about the news media’s constitutional cases, and it 
is subtly reflected in popular critiques as well.  It is plainly contra-
dicted, however, by the briefs submitted to the Court.  The litigants 
did not attempt to bifurcate the First Amendment and to tie their 
claims to particular clauses.  And to the extent that they distinguished 
speech and press, it was to separate expression and newsgathering, 
not to establish an identity-based partition that would deny rights to 
those lacking certain credentials or institutional affiliations.  The liti-
gants’ arguments were also anything but radical.  They fit comfortably 
under the rubric of the autonomy-model, which the Court has largely 
endorsed as a matter of principle, even though it has lost track of it 
on occasion. 
The Court, meanwhile, has muddled this area of law by waffling 
between the expression, autonomy, and special-rights models, by us-
ing the rhetoric of both the expert and egalitarian conceptions of the 
press, and by not providing a clear basis for distinguishing free-
speech and free-press controversies. 
 
266 PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2008:  AN 
ANNUAL REPORT ON AMERICAN JOURNALISM (2008), 
http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.com/2008/printable_overview_chapter.htm. 
267 See Daniel Schorr, The Government’s Current War with the Free Press, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, July 7, 2006, at 9. 
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Even more problematic from the media’s perspective is that the 
Court has frequently mischaracterized the nature of special rights by 
attaching that label to anything that benefits the press, irrespective of 
how “press” is defined.  The Court has also exacerbated misconcep-
tions about the litigants’ claims by suggesting that they would require 
the abandonment of long-standing neutrality principles or the appli-
cation of exotic theories.  In many cases in which the Court rejected 
the litigants’ claims, however, the litigants were making logical ex-
trapolations from the Court’s earlier rulings—often relying on 
autonomy-model principles that the Court had previously embraced 
but refused to revisit. 
The fact that many of the litigants’ arguments flow directly from 
the Court’s earlier opinions suggests that the two sides are not impos-
sibly far apart.  Going forward, if the Court could become slightly 
more solicitous of the autonomy principles relied on by the litigants 
in cases like Zurcher, Herbert, and Branzburg, and if the litigants could 
allay some of the Court’s concerns by being even clearer about their 
interest in protecting the core functions of the press and not the spe-
cial status of the claimants, there will be some opportunity for a sen-
sible reordering of press law and perhaps a reconciliation between 
the media and the Court.  Until then, those opposed to the broaden-
ing of press protections will no doubt continue repeating the famil-
iar, if apocryphal, tales about the press’s brazen demands for special 
rights, and in so doing, they will further impair the right of everyone 
to gather and report news. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
